NeuronGuard is a fine‑tuning defense for large language models that hardens them against both jailbreak and neuron‑level attacks. It redistributes safety signals across many neurons by identifying safety‑critical ones with per‑layer linear classifiers, enforcing refusal behavior when those neurons are ablated, and applying KL‑divergence regularization for consistency. A randomized gradient projection preserves task performance, and the authors provide a formal guarantee that NeuronGuard lowers the attack success rate upper bound, with experiments showing near‑zero success rates across multiple models and attack strategies.
By Anjun Gao, Yueyang Quan, Yufei Xia, Zhuqing Liu, Minghong Fang
arXiv:2602. 16835v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety alignment is essential for the responsible deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs).
By Sasha Behrouzi, Lichao Wu, Mohamadreza Rostami, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
arXiv:2508.09473v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Ensuring robust safety alignment while preserving utility is critical for the reliable deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, c...
By Birong Pan, Jianhao Chen, Mayi Xu, Qiankun Pi, Yuanyuan Zhu, Ming Zhong, Tieyun Qian
arXiv:2607. 08883v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Behavioral alignment in large language models often masks fragile internal safety representations.
By Ege \c{C}akar, Hannah Guan, Kayden Kehe
The paper introduces Constrained Knowledge Unlearning (CKU), a safety alignment method that selectively prunes gradients of neurons in specific MLP layers to delete harmful knowledge while preserving useful information. CKU identifies a subset of neurons associated with valuable knowledge and protects them during the unlearning process, thereby mitigating jailbreak attacks. Experiments show that CKU improves model safety without sacrificing overall performance, and the study also offers insights into neuron knowledge sensitivity across MLP layers.
By Zesheng Shi, Yucheng Zhou, Jing Li
arXiv:2606. 22686v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Modern Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on extensive safety alignment, yet the mechanistic basis of refusal remains opaque.
By Shivam Ratnakar, Kartikeya Vats
arXiv:2508. 10029v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models can still be manipulated through white-box interventions that modify their internal representations.
By Wenpeng Xing, Bohan Yang, Mohan Li, Chunqiang Hu, Haitao Xu, Ningyu Zhang, Bo Lin, Meng Han
arXiv:2609.00051v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Despite extensive alignment efforts, Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to generating unsafe content under adversarial prompting, yet the...
By Kuan-Lin Chu, Chung-En Sun, Tsui-Wei Weng
arXiv:2608. 14392v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Neuron- and path-level interventions offer the finest-grained route to defending large language models (LLMs) against jailbreak attacks, yet existing methods fall short of this promise, i.
By Wei Zhao, Zhe Li, Peixin Zhang, Jun Sun
arXiv:2606. 28153v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks bypass LLM safety alignment, yet their mechanisms remain poorly understood.
By Yanchen Yin, Dongqi Han, Linghui Li
arXiv:2509. 03985v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In deployment and application, large language models (LLMs) typically undergo safety alignment to prevent illegal and unethical outputs.
By Chuhan Zhang, Ye Zhang, Bowen Shi, Yuyou Gan, Tianyu Du, Shouling Ji, Dazhan Deng, Yingcai Wu
arXiv:2605.01913v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Fine-tuning safety-aligned language models for downstream tasks often leads to substantial degradation of refusal behavior, making models vul...
By Sadia Asif, Mohammad Mohammadi Amiri