NeuronTune: Fine-Grained Neuron Modulation for Balanced Safety-Utility Alignment in LLMs
Read the original on arXiv AI →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.
The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.
NeuronGuard is a fine‑tuning defense for large language models that hardens them against both jailbreak and neuron‑level attacks. It redistributes safety signals across many neurons by identifying safety‑critical ones with per‑layer linear classifiers, enforcing refusal behavior when those neurons are ablated, and applying KL‑divergence regularization for consistency. A randomized gradient projection preserves task performance, and the authors provide a formal guarantee that NeuronGuard lowers the attack success rate upper bound, with experiments showing near‑zero success rates across multiple models and attack strategies.
arXiv:2602. 16835v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety alignment is essential for the responsible deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs).
arXiv:2512. 05518v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) play a critical role in the democratization of AI, yet their "open" nature introduces more avenues for malicious actors to misuse them for harmful purposes.
arXiv:2607. 08883v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Behavioral alignment in large language models often masks fragile internal safety representations.
arXiv:2609.00051v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Despite extensive alignment efforts, Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to generating unsafe content under adversarial prompting, yet the...
The paper introduces SEAL, a training-time, parameter‑efficient defense that attaches a plug‑and‑play adapter to the shared expert component of Mixture‑of‑Experts models, and SEAL++, which adds an orthogonal constraint to preserve existing safety subspaces. By leveraging the always‑activated shared expert, SEAL mitigates the structural vulnerability of sparse routing to adversarial manipulation, reducing attack success rates by up to 60% with minimal impact on model capability. The approach is evaluated across six attack scenarios involving harmful prompting, jailbreaks, malicious fine‑tuning, and neuron pruning.