arXiv:2608. 16334v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Keystroke dynamics (typing patterns) can be used as a behavioural biometric modality for user authentication, with applications such as fraud prevention.
By Nuwan Kaluarachchi, Sevvandi Kandanaarachchi, Kristen Moore, Arathi Arakala, Conrad Sanderson
The paper introduces BIND, a framework that binds a human’s biometric data to an AI agent’s identity and task-specific authority, enabling secure, real‑time delegation of control. By generating a token that an AI agent presents to an Identity Auditor, the system performs biometric authentication and recovers the agent’s ID and scope, providing non‑repudiable proof of human oversight. A practical implementation using face features and a fuzzy commitment scheme with turbo error‑correcting codes achieves a 96% true match rate at zero false match rate and supports 1024‑bit agent tokens.
By Joseph Geo Benjamin, Anil K Jain, Karthik Nandakumar
arXiv:2608.20884v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Face recognition systems (FRSs) are increasingly deployed in critical real-world services for authentication, such as banking applications and airport...
By Changjin Kim, Seunghun Paik, Dongsoo Kim, Jae Hong Seo
arXiv:2606. 31272v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents increasingly acquire and execute skills at runtime: bundles of prompt instructions, executable code, and tool declarations fetched from marketplaces and other agents.
By Hongliang Liu, Yuhao Wu, Tung-Ling Li
arXiv:2606. 21900v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Continuous authentication for mobile and zero-trust systems requires nonintrusive evidence confirming the enrolled user-device context remains valid after initial login.
By Stergios Lantzos, Ilias Syrigos, Apostolos Apostolaras, Thanasis Korakis
RouteScan is a non‑intrusive auditing framework that detects harmful behavior in Mixture‑of‑Experts (MoE) large language models by analyzing expert‑routing telemetry captured from GPU execution. It uses the number of active GPU threads during the prefilling phase as a micro‑architectural fingerprint to isolate cross‑domain risk indicators and precisely identify malicious prompts. Evaluations on four open‑source MoE LLMs show strong generalization with AUROC > 0.91 on unseen harmful domains, while privacy tests indicate that full prompts cannot be reliably recovered from aggregated telemetry.
By Bo Lv, Zhiheng Xu, KeDong Xiu, Ruyi Ding, Tianhang Zheng, Zhibo Wang, Kui Ren
arXiv:2607. 20890v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: On-device federated learning (FL) enables privacy-preserving and personalized model training on resource-constrained devices such as smartphones and IoT nodes.
By Hyeong-Gun Joo, Songnam Hong, Dong-Joon Shin
arXiv:2607. 23389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Conventional CAPTCHAs pose puzzles that modern AI systems increasingly solve, while behavioral and cryptographic-attestation defenses carry privacy or enrollment costs.
By David Noever, Forrest McKee
arXiv:2407. 10887v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Growing concerns over the theft and misuse of Large Language Models (LLMs) underscore the need for effective fingerprinting to link a model to its original version and detect misuse.
By Mark Russinovich, Yanan Cai, Ahmed Salem
arXiv:2609.06271v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Some low-cost Internet of Things (IoT) sensor deployments lack device-level source authentication, leaving them vulnerable to impersonation or inject...
By Nahom Birhan
arXiv:2608. 10760v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has become the de-facto interface for connecting LLM agents to enterprise tools, and adoption has been explosive: within a year, large organizations went from zero to dozens of internally built MCP servers.
By Suraj Kumar, Amy Wang, Srinivasan Manoharan
arXiv:2607. 05518v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents issue tool calls on the basis of text they cannot verify, so any party who controls part of the context can forge the appearance of authority.
By Sai Varun Kodathala