arXiv AI

RecurGuard: Runtime Monitoring for Reasoning-Token Consumption Attacks

arXiv:2606. 07968v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Reasoning-capable large language models can be induced to spend their generation budget on injected decoy tasks rather than answering the user's question, causing denial of service when no final answer is produced and denial of wallet when excess output tokens are billed.

arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 21

OverThink: Slowdown Attacks on Reasoning LLMs

The paper introduces OverThink, a slowdown attack that forces reasoning language models (RLMs) to produce many more reasoning tokens while still giving correct answers. By injecting decoy reasoning problems—such as Markov decision processes, language translation, or graphic comprehension—into the model’s context, attackers can dramatically increase token generation (up to 46× on SQuAD and 17× on coding agents). The study evaluates the attack on both proprietary and open-source RLMs across multiple datasets, explores multimodal and coding‑agent variants, and tests several defenses, concluding that defending against OverThink is challenging and that newer RLMs are even more vulnerable due to higher per‑token costs and increased reasoning token usage.

By Abhinav Kumar, Jaechul Roh, Ali Naseh, Marzena Karpinska, Mohit Iyyer, Amir Houmansadr, Eugene Bagdasarian
arXiv AI
Sep 25

Prefilling the Reasoning Channel: Output-Prefix Attacks on Reasoning LLMs

The paper investigates a new attack method called output‑prefix attacks on reasoning LLMs, where an attacker prepends a malicious text to the model’s output, thereby conditioning all subsequent tokens on that prefix. The study systematically isolates the scratchpad reasoning channel as a vulnerable vector and compares three attack types—reasoning‑only, output‑prefix‑only, and combined reasoning‑plus‑output‑prefix—across both exposed and hidden reasoning models. Experiments on three 2026‑era frontier models (Gemini 3 Flash Preview, DeepSeek V4 Flash, and Claude Haiku 4.5) show that reasoning alone is largely ineffective, but adding a trivial output prefix can raise attack success rates to as high as 99% for some models, with contextual prefixes outperforming static ones and susceptibility varying by model.

By Luk\'a\v{s} Br\r{u}na, Robert Bridges, Adam Ek
arXiv Computation and Language
Aug 28

TRACES: Tagging Reasoning Steps for Adaptive Cost-Efficient Early-Stopping

TRACES (Tagging Reasoning Steps for Adaptive Cost‑Efficient Early‑Stopping) is a lightweight framework that tags reasoning steps of large‑language models in real time, enabling adaptive, cost‑efficient early stopping during inference. By monitoring the types of steps generated, the method identifies when models shift their reasoning after arriving at a correct answer, allowing for interpretable stopping criteria. Experiments on mathematical reasoning benchmarks (MATH500, GSM8K, AIME) and knowledge benchmarks (MMLU, GPQA) show token reductions of 20–50% while preserving accuracy, with more conservative thresholds needed for harder tasks such as BeyondAIME and IMO AnswerBench.

By Yannis Belkhiter, Seshu Tirupathi, Giulio Zizzo, John D. Kelleher
arXiv AI
Jun 3

Thinking Past the Answer: Evaluating Harmful Overthinking in Large Reasoning Models

arXiv:2606. 02835v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined.

By Simone Caldarella, Davide Talon, Rahaf Aljundi, Elisa Ricci, Massimiliano Mancini
arXiv AI
Sep 17

First Token Matters: Understanding Safety Collapse in Large Reasoning Models

The paper investigates why large reasoning models (LRMs) lose safety alignment when faced with harmful queries. By analyzing token-level refusal dynamics, the authors identify a vulnerability called Onset Refusal Collapse (ORC), where the refusal signal drops sharply at the first generated token, leading to unsafe responses. They introduce SafeToken, a lightweight inference-time intervention that injects a learned safety anchor at reasoning onset, which mitigates ORC, improves safety on harmful-query benchmarks, and largely preserves reasoning utility.

By Yizheng Yang, Haining Yu, Yuechen Wang, Yikai Hou, Xing Fu, Jinbo Yang, Tianqing Zhu