arXiv:2507. 11366v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study online optimization methods for zero-sum games, a fundamental problem in adversarial learning in machine learning, economics, and many other domains.
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
arXiv:2510. 18183v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Finding Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games remains a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning.
arXiv:2608. 15050v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study online convex optimization with dueling (pairwise comparison) feedback, where the learner observes only a binary preference between two queried points.
arXiv:2606. 00759v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent advances in artificial intelligence have expanded the focus from classical optimization to include equilibrium analysis in noncooperative games.
arXiv:2505. 01423v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Efficient computation of min-max problems is a central question in optimization, learning, games, and control.
arXiv:2606. 23995v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recent work has established that regularized policy gradient methods such as PPO, when used in self-play, can match or exceed specialized game-theoretic algorithms for solving two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games.
arXiv:2605. 29032v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) agents typically learn world models by minimizing predictive loss.
arXiv:2509. 25618v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games.
arXiv:2606. 06486v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In this paper, we study regret minimization in repeated games with \emph{adaptive} opponents who can respond based on histories of play.
arXiv:2409. 01447v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We present a finite-sample analysis of decentralized learning in two-player zero-sum matrix games and stochastic games, with a focus on best-response-based learning algorithms.
arXiv:2607. 08012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies an online variant of the assistance games framework, where an informed agent and an uninformed agent repeatedly interact over $T$ timesteps to optimize a common reward function.
arXiv:2602. 21436v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In this paper, we study last-iterate convergence of learning algorithms in bilinear saddle-point problems, a preferable notion of convergence that captures the day-to-day behavior of learning dynamics.