arXiv:2606. 23858v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A primary challenge in AI safety is the existence of adversarial examples -- slightly distorted inputs that cause a neural network (NN) to misclassify.
By Merkouris Papamichail, Konstantinos Varsos, Giorgos Flouris, Jo\~ao Marques-Silva
arXiv:2609.39768v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Certifying a deployed neural network raises decision problems that the verification literature has not classified: whether the model carries a backdo...
By Adrian Wurm
arXiv:2606. 31653v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Certified training aims to produce models whose predictions can be formally verified against adversarial perturbations, typically by optimising upper bounds on the worst-case loss over an allowed perturbation set.
By Matteo Melis, Jesus Martinez Del Rincon, Vishal Sharma
PANDA is a scalable system that uses zero‑knowledge proofs to certify the robustness and fairness of neural networks without revealing their private parameters. Built on the CROWN robustness framework, PANDA introduces a novel algorithm for proving linear relaxation bounds on non‑linear activation layers, producing lightweight proofs. The system can generate proofs for networks with over 2.9 million parameters in just five minutes and verify them in ten seconds, scaling polynomially with network size and enabling verification of models four orders of magnitude larger than prior ZKP‑based approaches.
By Youwei Zhong, Ben Merbaum, Timos Antonopoulos, Ning Luo, Charalampos Papamanthou, Katerina Sotiraki, Ruzica Piskac
arXiv:2609. 10866v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Reinforcement learning (RL) agents deployed in real-world environments are often vulnerable to adversarial perturbations in state observations, creating risks in safety-critical applications.
By Tong Li, Saunak Kumar Panda, Yisha Xiang
arXiv:2609.06036v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Proposal-based controllers---learned policies, language-model planners, and other black-box \emph{generators}---are increasingly deployed behind runtim...
By Guangxi Wan, Yongbo Xie, Yuqi Liu, Qingwei Dong, Qingxin Li, Hongfei Bai, Peng Zeng
arXiv:2603. 13334v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Lipschitz-based robustness certification bounds a network's sensitivity through concrete numerical computation rather than symbolic reasoning, and so scales efficiently.
By Toby Murray
arXiv:2605. 09200v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study adversarial noisy bandits given a known function class $\mathcal{F}$.
By Steve Hanneke, Kun Wang
arXiv:2608. 11181v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: When a probabilistic predictor answers many conditional-probability queries, are its answers self-consistent, and can this be verified in polynomial time?
By Orr Paradise, Oliver Richardson, Yoshua Bengio, Shafi Goldwasser
arXiv:2607. 14375v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study exact verification of ReLU networks in an adversarial smoothed model.
By Mojtaba Soltanalian
The paper presents an interactive probabilistically checkable proof (PCP) protocol that allows a polynomial‑time verifier to check the approximate consistency of a probabilistic predictor defined by two circuits, P and Q. By evaluating these circuits at a few points and querying a proof oracle that encodes a witnessing probability distribution, the verifier can confirm that the predictor’s many conditional‑probability claims are self‑consistent. The authors also establish that the problem of verifying l₂‑approximate consistency for explicit probabilistic claims lies in NP, with certificates of size O(mn + log B), and show how to eliminate dependence on the input bit‑precision B through a small additive gap.
By Orr Paradise, Oliver Richardson, Yoshua Bengio, Shafi Goldwasser
We study the problem of \emph{adversarially robust} PAC learning. In this framework, the learner observes independent samples from an unknown distribution over $\mathcal{X} \times \{0,1\}$, as in clas...