arXiv:2606. 02876v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Randomized smoothing (RS) uses a smoothed classifier to provide architecture-agnostic certificates of $\ell_2$ classification robustness, but its dependence on per-input Monte Carlo (MC) sampling undermines its use in real-time systems.
arXiv:2607. 19855v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Adversarial robustness is commonly evaluated with predefined attack ensembles, such as AutoAttack, at a single perturbation budget $\varepsilon$ and on a selective choice of perturbation norms.
The paper introduces a unified evaluation framework for assessing the physical adversarial robustness of Vision‑Language Models (VLMs) deployed at the edge. It defines a conditional attack success rate (cASR) metric that counts only images where the model still localizes objects under a gray occluder, and categorizes failures into omission, substitution, and displacement. Benchmarking shows that compact grounding VLMs can be as vulnerable as traditional object detectors, with omission being the only failure visible to downstream systems, while displacement and substitution pose potentially more dangerous risks, especially under distribution shift.
arXiv:2607. 06592v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Object detectors have many applications in safety-critical systems, but they are known to be sensitive to worst-case perturbations such as adversarial attacks, which limits their applicability in real-world scenarios.
The paper investigates whether pixels alone can determine an image’s origin—human, AI class, or specific generator—under adversarial edits. It establishes a minimax limit: the best possible robust acceptance gap equals the minimum total‑variation distance between the target distribution and attacked source distributions, independent of verifier design. The study also shows that practical public verifiers can fail before reaching this theoretical ceiling, highlighting the need to evaluate both statistical limits and deployed verifier behavior separately.
arXiv:2607. 13801v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM)-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) are increasingly studied for security monitoring, yet their robustness against feasible traffic manipulation remains largely empirical.
arXiv:2606. 23858v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A primary challenge in AI safety is the existence of adversarial examples -- slightly distorted inputs that cause a neural network (NN) to misclassify.
arXiv:2606. 31653v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Certified training aims to produce models whose predictions can be formally verified against adversarial perturbations, typically by optimising upper bounds on the worst-case loss over an allowed perturbation set.
arXiv:2610.17382v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Score-based black-box adversarial attacks pose a serious threat to deployed machine learning systems by exploiting repeated model queries to craft ad...
arXiv:2605. 25889v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models reach high success rates on clean inputs but collapse under small adversarial perturbations: a $16/255$ PGD attack drops OpenVLA-7B's LIBERO success from $95\%$ to under $5\%$.
Object detectors have many applications in safety-critical systems, but they are known to be sensitive to worst-case perturbations such as adversarial attacks, which limits their applicability in real-world scenarios. Compared with classification, adversarial robustness for object detection has received less attention, and existing methods are often tied to adversarial training, whose performance may not transfer across attacks, perturbation budgets, or architectures.
arXiv:2606. 02267v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial examples poses a significant challenge for real-world deployment.