arXiv:2607. 04145v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Adversarial attacks guide and provide additional training and test data for both adversarial training and adversarial robustness validation, and expose the 'piecewise linearity' of deep learning based models.
By Naman Goyal, Milan Chaudhari
arXiv:2606. 01437v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are highly susceptible to adversarial perturbations, leading to extensive research on robustness for safety-critical applications.
By Daniel Sadig, Mohammadreza Maleki, Hamed Karimi, Reza Samavi
The paper introduces RIBA, a reinforcement‑learning inspired black‑box adversarial attack that generates perturbations for neural networks with fewer queries than existing methods. RIBA achieves a 25.4% reduction in median queries on ResNet‑18/Cifar10 and a 22.5% reduction on Vit‑B/16/ImageNet, while matching white‑box attack performance on an adversarially trained model.
By Florian Krone, Elena Hoemann, Sven Hallerbach
arXiv:2608. 15113v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Learned image compression (LIC) has demonstrated remarkable rate-distortion (RD) performance in benign settings.
By Jiaming Liang, Chi-Man Pun, Weisi Lin
arXiv:2505. 19840v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have achieved widespread success yet remain prone to adversarial attacks.
By Binyan Xu, Xilin Dai, Di Tang, Kehuan Zhang
arXiv:2511. 13749v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Deep neural networks are known to be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, which are small, carefully crafted inputs that lead to incorrect predictions.
By Ci Lin, Tet Yeap, Iluju Kiringa
arXiv:2606. 27784v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The existence of adversarial attacks is often attributed to the presence of non-robust features in neural networks.
By Ta\"iga Gon\c{c}alves, Yongsong Huang, Tomo Miyazaki, Shinichiro Omachi
arXiv:2606. 31653v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Certified training aims to produce models whose predictions can be formally verified against adversarial perturbations, typically by optimising upper bounds on the worst-case loss over an allowed perturbation set.
By Matteo Melis, Jesus Martinez Del Rincon, Vishal Sharma
The paper introduces Fast Preemptive Robustification (FPR), a lightweight defense that enhances the robustness of deep neural networks against transferable adversarial attacks. By sharpening Laplacian responses through a single 3×3 channel‑wise convolution, FPR eliminates the need for surrogate models, iterative optimization, or specialized training. Experiments show that FPR lowers untargeted attack success rates by 12.7% and reduces targeted attack success from 10.7% to 4.1%.
By Jiaming Liang, Chi-Man Pun
arXiv:2607. 06592v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Object detectors have many applications in safety-critical systems, but they are known to be sensitive to worst-case perturbations such as adversarial attacks, which limits their applicability in real-world scenarios.
By Vincent L\'eb\'e (IRIT, DTIPG - SNCF, UT3), Yannick Prudent (IRIT, DTIPG - SNCF, UT3), Corentin Friedrich (IRIT, DTIPG - SNCF, UT3), Thomas Massena (IRIT, DTIPG - SNCF, UT3), Ronan Sicre (IRIT), Franck Mamalet
The paper demonstrates that undervolting GPUs during CNN training introduces stochastic faults that act as implicit regularization, improving adversarial robustness while reducing power consumption. Experiments on LeNet, VGG-6, and MobileNetV3 trained on MNIST and CIFAR-10 show that undervolted models consistently outperform nominal-voltage models in both standard and adversarial training regimes. The approach offers a hardware-level defense that requires no algorithmic changes and yields significant energy savings due to the quadratic relationship between dynamic power and supply voltage.
By Behnam Omidi, Ahmad Tahmasivand, Husam Alsyouri, Saba Al-Sayouri, Chongzhou Fang, Ihsen Alouani, Khaled N. Khasawneh
arXiv:2504. 14798v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Machine Unlearning (MUL) has emerged as a key mechanism for privacy protection and content regulation, yet current techniques often fail to guarantee the complete removal of sensitive information.
By Hao Xuan, Xingyu Li