The paper investigates whether pixels alone can determine an image’s origin—human, AI class, or specific generator—under adversarial edits. It establishes a minimax limit: the best possible robust acceptance gap equals the minimum total‑variation distance between the target distribution and attacked source distributions, independent of verifier design. The study also shows that practical public verifiers can fail before reaching this theoretical ceiling, highlighting the need to evaluate both statistical limits and deployed verifier behavior separately.
By Kai Yao
arXiv:2608. 15971v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Dual-encoder models such as CLIP score an image-caption pair by a single inner product of two independently computed unit vectors, and fail at binding, often scoring near chance when asked to distinguish "a red car and a blue dog" from "a blue car and a red dog".
By Kin Ian Lo
arXiv:2608. 15475v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Quantized Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models expose a weight-fault surface: Rowhammer-style faults can corrupt deployed INT8 bits.
By Yudong Gao, Linghan Chen, Wenhan Wu, Mia Zhou, Jiyao Wang, Kaiyan Ji, Mingyu Guo, Honglong Chen
arXiv:2606. 12502v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We propose that value -- the quantity goal-directed agents create, destroy, and exchange -- is a lawful structural quantity in the same category as information.
By Cheng Qian
arXiv:2605. 24042v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Of $1{,}536$ Gaussian release covariances we tested for single-layer hidden-state privacy, zero achieve both moderate utility and moderate privacy against an adaptive retrieval attacker.
By Alexander Okezue Bell
We study the problem of \emph{adversarially robust} PAC learning. In this framework, the learner observes independent samples from an unknown distribution over $\mathcal{X} \times \{0,1\}$, as in clas...