arXiv:2606. 23716v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Legal AI benchmark research frequently invokes the assumption that large language models can improve access to justice, including for people who cannot access lawyers in order to understand and exercise their legal rights.
By Andrew Lou, David Shin
arXiv:2605. 28183v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We introduce the BenGER (Benchmark for German Law) dataset for evaluating LLM systems on subsumption-based legal reasoning in German law.
By Sebastian Nagl, Ann-Kristin Mayrhofer, Martin Heidebach, Aleyna Ko\c{c}ak, Anne Zettelmeier, Elly Breu, Angelina Greiner, Sofija Milijas, Matthias Grabmair
The paper introduces a systematic method for comparing different formalizations of the same legal provision by analyzing their inferences on individual cases. It matches formalizations at the node level, derives shared interfaces, and uses a SAT solver to identify edge cases where any two formalizations disagree. The authors apply this approach to ten EU provisions formalized by nine advanced LLMs, finding that behavioral divergence is largely uncorrelated with structural agreement and that the resulting edge cases expose distinct types of disagreement, some reflecting real legal controversies.
By Julius Vernie, Matthias Grabmair
arXiv:2608. 10268v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) increasingly mediate legal determinations over what human rights are realized, and how.
By Savannah Thais, Wm. Matthew Kennedy, Abhigyan Acherjee, Matilda Wysocki, Malcolm Langford, Caitlin Kraft Buchman
The study examines whether large language models (LLMs) can perform legally meaningful reasoning by testing OpenAI GPT 5.4 on European Court of Human Rights case forecasting. Using various prompting strategies, the authors find that the model produces structurally complete but substantively shallow analyses, and that LLM-as-a-Judge evaluators are internally consistent yet only weakly aligned with human annotators. The expert-curated prompt yields more comprehensive reasoning but does not improve prediction accuracy, leading the authors to caution against relying solely on automated LLM evaluation or using task accuracy as a proxy for reasoning quality.
By Amogh Raina, Ilias Chalkidis, Daniel Hershcovich, Henrik Palmer Olsen
arXiv:2607. 23888v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In the United States, artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly deployed amid limited federal regulation.
By Julie Yu, Rock Yuren Pang, Jevan Hutson, Katharina Reinecke
arXiv:2606. 23913v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This article develops an architecture that creates a formally verifiable reward signal to train legal AI, adapting the LLM proposes, verifier disposes paradigm from mathematical AI to the distinctive demands of law.
By Armin Heydari (Harvard University), Torben Leowald (Columbia University)
arXiv:2606. 12415v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The rapid global expansion of artificial intelligence regulation has generated, across multiple jurisdictions, a demand for legal expertise dedicated to AI that the market has addressed in a fragmented manner.
By Nicola Fabiano
arXiv:2608. 02699v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When algorithms make or influence consequential decisions---about loan eligibility, hiring, or healthcare---EU law grants affected individuals a Right to Explanation.
By Benjamin Fresz, Elena Dubovitskaya, Marco F. Huber
The paper argues that hallucinations by legal language models should be judged as failures of legal warrant rather than mere factual or citation errors. It defines claim-authority warrant as a context-sensitive relationship between a legal claim and applicable, current authority, and proposes that evaluating warrant can uncover failures missed by traditional accuracy or citation metrics. The authors outline a pilot study, benchmark specifications, and a research agenda to assess whether legal AI systems’ claims are properly licensed by law.
By Maksym Taranukhin, Vered Shwartz
arXiv:2603. 22973v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Applying computational methods to law at scale requires separating genuine legal reasoning from surface similarity.
By Avrile Floro (UPHF), Tamara Dhorasoo (UPHF), Soline Pellez (UPHF), Nils Holzenberger
arXiv:2608. 04011v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This article examines the enduring epistemic and methodological crisis of traditional legal practice in light of the opportunities and constraints introduced by artificial intelligence.
By Ali Goksu, F. Gozde Kardes, Mustafa Yaylali