arXiv AI

Towards a New Grammar of Reasoning for Artificial Legal Intelligence and the Mecelle as Its Semantic Protocol

arXiv:2608. 04011v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This article examines the enduring epistemic and methodological crisis of traditional legal practice in light of the opportunities and constraints introduced by artificial intelligence.

arXiv AI
Jun 9

Beyond Probabilistic Similarity: Structural, Temporal, and Causal Limitations of Retrieval-Augmented Generation in the Legal Domain

arXiv:2606. 09724v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has become a standard architectural response to unreliability in legal AI, yet high-profile failures, including fabricated citations submitted to courts and anachronistic legal content presented as current, continue to appear across jurisdictions.

By Hudson de Martim
arXiv Computation and Language
Sep 24

LEGO: Synergizing Expert GraphRAG and Expert Chain-of-Thought for Legal Reasoning

LEGO is a dual‑module framework that combines a Legal Expert GraphRAG system with an expert Chain‑of‑Thought approach to enhance complex legal reasoning. The GraphRAG component uses an expert‑annotated civil code graph and a greedy normative‑coverage retrieval algorithm to extract relevant provision subgraphs, while the Chain‑of‑Thought module structures retrieved provisions and case facts into a Provision‑Fact‑Conclusion reasoning flow. Using a Qwen3‑8B backbone, LEGO achieves 40.53% exact‑match accuracy on LawExamQA_Civil, surpassing baseline RAG and CoT models and matching larger models on multi‑hop and open‑ended benchmarks, with ablation studies confirming the complementary benefits of both modules.

By Qingjing Chen, Junkai Zhang, Shaochun Wang, Jiahao Ding, Siyuan Zheng, Yukun Yan, Zhi Zheng, Antonino Rotolo, Yun Liu, Weixing Shen
arXiv Computation and Language
Sep 17

Legal LLM Hallucination Should Be Evaluated as Failure of Legal Warrant

The paper argues that hallucinations by legal language models should be judged as failures of legal warrant rather than mere factual or citation errors. It defines claim-authority warrant as a context-sensitive relationship between a legal claim and applicable, current authority, and proposes that evaluating warrant can uncover failures missed by traditional accuracy or citation metrics. The authors outline a pilot study, benchmark specifications, and a research agenda to assess whether legal AI systems’ claims are properly licensed by law.

By Maksym Taranukhin, Vered Shwartz
arXiv AI
Sep 2

Human-AI Co-Interpretation for Responsible AI: A Hermeneutic Perspective

The paper examines how large language model (LLM) outputs are increasingly used in contexts that demand justified interpretations, such as law, education, policy analysis, and public moral debate. It identifies a recurring failure—interpretive misplacement—where model-generated readings are treated as settled meanings without explicit interpretive frames, provenance, or defensible alternatives, leading to accountability loss. Drawing on philosophical hermeneutics, the author proposes design principles for human‑AI co‑interpretation, reorganizes existing LLM techniques into hermeneutically responsible patterns, and discusses implications for legal practice, education, scholarship, and public discourse, while framing digital hermeneutics as a literacy for critically engaging with AI‑mediated texts.

By Behrooz Razeghi
arXiv AI
Sep 18

By Their Fruits You Will Know Them: Comparing Formalizations of Law by the Decisions They Encode

The paper introduces a systematic method for comparing different formalizations of the same legal provision by analyzing their inferences on individual cases. It matches formalizations at the node level, derives shared interfaces, and uses a SAT solver to identify edge cases where any two formalizations disagree. The authors apply this approach to ten EU provisions formalized by nine advanced LLMs, finding that behavioral divergence is largely uncorrelated with structural agreement and that the resulting edge cases expose distinct types of disagreement, some reflecting real legal controversies.

By Julius Vernie, Matthias Grabmair