arXiv Machine Learning

Nonlinear Axiomatic Attribution for Cooperative Games

arXiv:2607. 09869v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The Shapley value is a widely used concept in attribution problems, as it uniquely satisfies the axioms of linearity, consistency, equal treatment, and efficiency.

arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 2

ShaplEIG: Bayesian Experimental Design for Shapley Value Estimation

arXiv:2606. 02247v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Shapley values are a principled attribution measure widely used in interpretable machine learning, but their exact computation scales exponentially with the number of players, motivating a wide range of approximation methods based on value function evaluations of sampled coalitions.

By David Rundel, Fabian Fumagalli, Maximilian Muschalik, Bernd Bischl, Matthias Feurer
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Aug 5

Computationally Efficient Collaborative Communication Via Regularity-Based Coarsening

Our results show that the existence of a short high-utility protocol already suffices for efficient communication. In particular, in a game with $n$ possible observations and $m$ actions: (1) For any achievable target utility $α$, we give an algorithm with $\mathrm{poly}(n, m, 1/ε)$ runtime that designs a protocol achieving utility at least $α-ε$ using only $2^{\mathcal O(CC_α(G))}/ε^2$ bits of communication.

arXiv AI
2d ago

Robust Nash Alignment under Preference Uncertainty

Robust Nash Alignment introduces a game-theoretic framework that seeks a policy with a high worst-case win rate against both an adversarial competitor and any preference kernel within an ambiguity set around a nominal preference. The authors propose a four-player primal-dual proxy game and an optimistic mirror descent-ascent algorithm to efficiently optimize this robust objective, proving convergence guarantees and demonstrating improved performance in controlled tabular games and LLM alignment experiments.

By Shihab Ahmed, Debamita Ghosh, David Tang, Yudan Wang, Alvaro Velasquez, Yue Wang
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 4

Meritocratic Fairness via $K$-Shapley Values in Budgeted Combinatorial Bandits with Full-Bandit Feedback

arXiv:2605. 00762v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study meritocratic fairness in budgeted combinatorial multi-armed bandits with full-bandit feedback, where a learner selects at most $K$ arms per time step and observes only the noisy aggregate reward of the selected set.

By Shradha Sharma, Shweta Jain, Swapnil Dhamal