arXiv:2606. 02247v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Shapley values are a principled attribution measure widely used in interpretable machine learning, but their exact computation scales exponentially with the number of players, motivating a wide range of approximation methods based on value function evaluations of sampled coalitions.
By David Rundel, Fabian Fumagalli, Maximilian Muschalik, Bernd Bischl, Matthias Feurer
arXiv:2605. 01961v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Learning from human preference data is becoming a useful tool, from fine-tuning large language models to training reinforcement learning agents.
By Maheed H. Ahmed, Mahsa Ghasemi
arXiv:2603. 14014v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We introduce Aumann-SHAP, an interaction-aware framework that decomposes counterfactual transitions by restricting the model to a local hypercube connecting baseline and counterfactual features.
By Adam Belahcen, St\'ephane Mussard
arXiv:2512. 15765v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Data valuation is a natural framework for understanding which preference datasets matter most when aligning a Large Language Model (LLM) using multiple sources.
By M\'elissa Tamine, Otmane Sakhi, Benjamin Heymann, Maxime Vono, Patrick Loiseau
arXiv:2606. 29169v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many important games have more than two players and imperfect information.
By Sam Ganzfried
arXiv:2408. 01382v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Originating in game theory, Shapley values are widely used for explaining a machine learning model's prediction by quantifying the contribution of each feature's value to the prediction.
By Paul-Gauthier No\'e, Miquel Perell\'o-Nieto, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois Bonastre, Peter Flach
arXiv:2601.08777v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Aligning large language models (LLMs) to serve users with heterogeneous and potentially conflicting preferences is a central challenge for pe...
By Yang Cai, Weiqiang Zheng
Our results show that the existence of a short high-utility protocol already suffices for efficient communication. In particular, in a game with $n$ possible observations and $m$ actions: (1) For any achievable target utility $α$, we give an algorithm with $\mathrm{poly}(n, m, 1/ε)$ runtime that designs a protocol achieving utility at least $α-ε$ using only $2^{\mathcal O(CC_α(G))}/ε^2$ bits of communication.
Robust Nash Alignment introduces a game-theoretic framework that seeks a policy with a high worst-case win rate against both an adversarial competitor and any preference kernel within an ambiguity set around a nominal preference. The authors propose a four-player primal-dual proxy game and an optimistic mirror descent-ascent algorithm to efficiently optimize this robust objective, proving convergence guarantees and demonstrating improved performance in controlled tabular games and LLM alignment experiments.
By Shihab Ahmed, Debamita Ghosh, David Tang, Yudan Wang, Alvaro Velasquez, Yue Wang
arXiv:2605. 00762v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study meritocratic fairness in budgeted combinatorial multi-armed bandits with full-bandit feedback, where a learner selects at most $K$ arms per time step and observes only the noisy aggregate reward of the selected set.
By Shradha Sharma, Shweta Jain, Swapnil Dhamal
arXiv:2608. 05327v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Our results show that the existence of a short high-utility protocol already suffices for efficient communication.
By Mark Bedaywi, Scott Emmons, Nika Haghtalab, Stuart Russell
arXiv:2606. 06486v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In this paper, we study regret minimization in repeated games with \emph{adaptive} opponents who can respond based on histories of play.
By Mingyang Liu, Asuman Ozdaglar, Tiancheng Yu, Kaiqing Zhang