The Interlocutor Effect: Why LLMs Leak More Personal Data to Agents Than Humans
arXiv:2606. 09844v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) alter their privacy behavior based on the perceived identity of their interlocutor.
arXiv:2601. 14660v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Agentic Large Language Models (LLMs) are models able to reason, plan, and execute tools over unstructured data.
arXiv:2606. 09844v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) alter their privacy behavior based on the perceived identity of their interlocutor.
arXiv:2609.14003v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Personal AI agents built on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly given access to a user's private data and communications in order to provid...
Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems can expose protected state through internal messages, tool arguments, logs, and persistent memory even when their public outputs appear innocuous. Existing privacy prompts, redaction methods, and source-level access controls restrict surface content or data access, but do not specify what a legitimately informed agent should disclose or how that disclosure may be reused downstream.
The paper introduces VoxPrivacy, a benchmark for assessing interactional privacy in Speech Language Models (SLMs). It evaluates models on a 32‑hour bilingual dataset across three difficulty tiers, revealing that most open‑source SLMs perform near random on conditional privacy decisions and even strong closed‑source systems struggle with proactive privacy inference. The authors also validate these findings on a real‑speech subset and show that fine‑tuning on a 4,000‑hour training set can improve privacy‑preserving capabilities while maintaining robustness.
arXiv:2606. 26627v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model agents increasingly query databases, search document collections, call external APIs, remember past interactions, and act on a user's behalf.
The paper investigates how privacy-preserving sanitization of user context in large language model (LLM) interactions affects downstream performance. It identifies three mechanisms—Context‑Dependent Utility, Strategic Adaptation, and Combinatorial Interplay—that explain when and how to sanitize data. Based on these insights, the authors propose an intent‑driven local protection framework using a lightweight model (Veilmind‑4B) to dynamically extract, sanitize, and restore context, achieving lower privacy leakage while maintaining higher utility than existing baselines.
arXiv:2607. 22695v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are capable of generalizing human language for the completion of never-before-seen tasks, leading to widespread deployment.
arXiv:2606. 24623v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation enhances large language models by incorporating external knowledge, but deploying it in sensitive scenarios risks privacy leakage via malicious prompts.
PrivDrift is a benchmark that tests whether user‑disclosed secrets can still be recovered by large language models after the conversation shifts to unrelated topics. It includes 1,000 controlled multi‑turn dialogues with seeded secrets, topic‑drift turns, and standardized extraction probes. Experiments on three LLMs with extended context windows show that dialogue‑level leakage remains substantial—between 38.7% and 54.6%—and is influenced by model, secret type, and persuasion intensity, while additional topic drift does not reliably reduce leakage.
For AI agents to be useful beyond simple chat, they must hold sensitive user context such as calendars, credentials, health records, and financial data. We study whether the mere presence of such secrets in a model's context window introduces hidden correlations into the model's benign outputs, allowing reconstruction even when the model correctly refuses direct extraction.
The paper argues that privacy in personalized AI should be viewed as a system-level issue rather than just a model-level one. It identifies four interconnected privacy‑risk channels in personalized AI and proposes four system‑level requirements—interaction trajectories, internal information flows, indirect leakage, and the privacy‑utility trade‑off—for evaluating privacy. The authors call for these requirements to be systematically incorporated into privacy audits of personalized AI systems.
arXiv:2609.35937v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: While prior work has documented privacy failures in LLM agents, it remains unclear how the presentation of privacy guidance influences their choice o...