arXiv:2606. 26057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems.
By Seth Dobrin, {\L}ukasz Chmiel
arXiv:2607. 15003v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The deployment of autonomous cyber-physical systems in safety-critical environments requires closed-loop control strategies (i.
By Riccardo Curcio, Toni Mancini, Enrico Tronci
arXiv:2606. 04634v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Trust in a decision-making system requires both safety guarantees and the ability to interpret and understand its behavior.
By Sabine Rieder, Stefan Pranger, Debraj Chakraborty, Jan K\v{r}et\'insk\'y, Bettina K\"onighofer
arXiv:2606. 31320v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safe online reinforcement learning requires policies to respect safety constraints while maintaining smooth optimization dynamics.
By Hongpeng Cao, Liqun Zhao, Yuliang Gu, Naira Hovakimyan, Lui Sha, Marco Caccamo
arXiv:2607. 22868v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Runtime guardrails act before irreversible tool calls, but their guarantees depend on what policy state is representable, what a judge observes, and whether intervention changes future behavior.
By Shawn Ray
arXiv:2606. 00270v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Shielding is an effective approach to formally guarantee the safety of reinforcement learning agents in Markov decision processes (MDPs).
By Edwin Hamel-De le Court, Thom Badings, Alessandro Abate, Francesco Belardinelli, Francesco Fabiano
arXiv:2608. 03662v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety shields are runtime enforcement mechanisms that restrict the actions of a controller to guarantee safety.
By Filip Cano, Thomas A. Henzinger, Konstantin Kueffner
arXiv:2607. 16242v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Fine-Tuning-as-a-Service (FTaaS) platforms let users train large language models (LLMs) on customized tasks, but this pipeline could erode models' safety alignment.
By Changyue Li, Jiaming He, Youliang Yuan, Jialin Wu, Boxi Yu, Zhicong Huang, Pinjia He
arXiv:2606. 28639v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We establish the mathematical limits of AGI safety in two forms: verifying a fixed system, and verifying that a certified safety property persists once the system self-modifies.
By Jose Pascual Gumbau Mezquita
arXiv:2608. 05695v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As large language model (LLM) agents increasingly invoke external tools and interact with real-world systems, unsafe actions may cause irreversible consequences on external states, user data, and downstream services.
By Wenhao Lin, Chenyu Yu, Xingwei Lin, Sicong Cao, Xiang Chen, Lei Xue, Le Yu, Letian Sha, Chunming Wu
arXiv:2601. 19612v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safe exploration is a key requirement for reinforcement learning (RL) agents to learn and adapt online, beyond controlled (e.
By Manuel Wendl, Yarden As, Manish Prajapat, Anton Pollak, Stelian Coros, Andreas Krause
arXiv:2509. 20008v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Penetration testing, the simulation of cyberattacks to identify security vulnerabilities, presents a sequential decision-making problem well-suited for reinforcement learning (RL) automation.
By Raphael Simon, Pieter Libin, Wim Mees