arXiv:2607. 27859v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Incentive programs are central to user acquisition in decentralized finance, but many reward systems rely on raw volume, transaction count, and wallet count, making them vulnerable to bots and sybil operations.
By Girish G N, Ashutosh Sahoo, Ajay Bhat, Akshay SP, Gurukiran S, Parag Paul, Dhanashekar Kandaswamy
arXiv:2605. 25815v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Agent-to-Agent (A2A) networks enable autonomous AI agents to collaborate by sharing reusable problem-solving instructions.
By Qiming Ye, Peixian Zhang, Yupeng He, Zifan Peng, Gareth Tyson
arXiv:2606. 26028v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As autonomous AI agents increasingly transact across organizational boundaries, a fundamental trust challenge emerges: how can an agent assess whether an unknown counterpart is trustworthy?
By Xihan Xiong, Zelin Li, Wei Wei, Qin Wang, William Knottenbelt, Zhipeng Wang
arXiv:2512. 16167v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Decentralized LLM-based multi-agent service economies face three vulnerabilities that undermine traditional trust mechanisms: reduced cost of fraud, difficulty in evaluating service quality, and instability of service content.
By Jiye Wang, Shiduo Yang, Ting Qiao, Jiayu Qin, Jianbin Li, Yu Wang, Yuanhe Zhao
arXiv:2608. 06469v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Collaborative machine learning among financial institutions must be both group-fair and robust against deliberate adversarial manipulation.
By Devharsh Trivedi, Nesrine Kaaniche, Nikos Triandopoulos, Maryline Laurent, Jackson Walters
The paper introduces the Agentic Commerce Bench (ACB), a benchmark for measuring fraud in AI agents that autonomously spend money. It presents a taxonomy of agentic commerce fraud, a dataset of twenty fraud classes derived from real production data, and an open‑source detector stack called gordonguard for auditing and replaying hostile counterparties. The study shows that current reasoning layers and security scanners perform poorly on many classes, highlighting the need for better detection mechanisms.
By Ankit Srivastava, Debjyoti Paul
As autonomous AI agents increasingly transact across organizational boundaries, a fundamental trust challenge emerges: how can an agent assess whether an unknown counterpart is trustworthy? The ERC-8004 protocol addresses this challenge with the first permissionless trust layer for AI agent economies, built around three on-chain registries for Identity, Reputation, and Validation.
arXiv:2605. 21115v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Federated learning (FL) has emerged as a promising paradigm for managing electric vehicle (EV) battery data in intelligent transportation systems (ITS), enabling privacy-preserving tasks such as anomaly detection and capacity estimation.
By Mouhamed Amine Bouchiha, Abdelaziz Amara Korba, Yacine Ghamri-Doudane
CAVEAT is a new benchmark that tests computer‑use agents (CUAs) in nine online marketplace environments where platform incentives may steer agents away from user goals. The study finds that agents succeed in choosing user‑optimal products only 78.6% of the time in neutral settings, dropping to 17.3% when steering mechanisms are active. By diagnosing three failure points—priority distortion, premature narrowing of options, and early commitment—CAVEAT-Harness interventions raise user‑optimal purchasing success by 55.0%.
By Yuxuan Li, Will Epperson, Wesley Deng, Zezhou Huang
arXiv:2504. 16116v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The Web3 ecosystem, underpinned by cryptographic primitives and decentralized consensus, represents a high-stakes environment where software vulnerabilities and incentive misalignments translate directly into financial loss.
By Enhao Huang, Pengyu Sun, Shuxun Wang, Zixin Lin, Alex Chen, Kaichun Hu, Joey Ouyang, Frank Li, Zhiyu Zhang, Haobo Wang, Yiming Li, Zhan Qin, James Yi, Gang Zhao, Ziang Ling, Lowes Yang
The paper investigates how adversarial signals can infiltrate large‑language‑model (LLM) based multi‑agent trading systems through the agents’ communication channels. By restricting the attacker to realistic inputs—source data and prompts—it studies role‑specific attacks on four functional roles (Analyst, Researcher, Trader, Risk Manager) and evaluates four communication topologies under data‑ and agent‑level attacks. Experiments across multiple assets, backbones, and target directions show that no architecture is inherently robust, highlighting the need for safer designs in agentic trading systems.
By CheolWon Na, Hao Ni, Lukasz Szpruch, Zhangyang Wang, Dhagash Mehta, Saurabh Nagrecha, Alejandro Lopez-Lira, Chanyeol Choi, Yongjae Lee, Jee-Hyong Lee
The paper presents a deployed system that scores blockchain addresses using their position in a massive multi‑chain transaction graph instead of relying on sanctions lists. The system operates on a single graph of 835 million addresses and 15.8 billion edges across five EVM chains, employing a shared inductive encoder with per‑chain normalization and two scoring heads. It demonstrates label‑free transfer, achieving high recall on held‑out positives for Base, Arbitrum, and Gnosis at a very low alert rate, and shows significant lead time over external registry events, while maintaining fast, reproducible serving performance.
By Yury Korolev