As autonomous AI agents increasingly transact across organizational boundaries, a fundamental trust challenge emerges: how can an agent assess whether an unknown counterpart is trustworthy? The ERC-8004 protocol addresses this challenge with the first permissionless trust layer for AI agent economies, built around three on-chain registries for Identity, Reputation, and Validation.
arXiv:2609.22944v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Autonomous AI agents increasingly act across organizational boundaries on behalf of human operators: they invoke third-party services, delegate subta...
By Oliver Aleksander Larsen, Mahyar Tourchi Moghaddam
arXiv:2605. 06738v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Autonomous AI agents already transact at production scale -- 69,000 bots, 165 million transactions, $50 million in volume on a single marketplace -- and any party can verify a signed credential without a central service.
By Lars Kersten Kroehl
arXiv:2609.21325v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Agentic marketplaces are emerging where AI agents with varying capabilities autonomously complete specialized tasks for buyers. A major challenge of su...
By Steve Drew, Jiayu Zhou
The paper introduces the Agentic Commerce Bench (ACB), a benchmark for measuring fraud in AI agents that autonomously spend money. It presents a taxonomy of agentic commerce fraud, a dataset of twenty fraud classes derived from real production data, and an open‑source detector stack called gordonguard for auditing and replaying hostile counterparties. The study shows that current reasoning layers and security scanners perform poorly on many classes, highlighting the need for better detection mechanisms.
By Ankit Srivastava, Debjyoti Paul
arXiv:2605. 25815v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Agent-to-Agent (A2A) networks enable autonomous AI agents to collaborate by sharing reusable problem-solving instructions.
By Qiming Ye, Peixian Zhang, Yupeng He, Zifan Peng, Gareth Tyson
The paper introduces DART, a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)-based framework that combines centralized orchestration with blockchain-enabled decentralized governance to manage reputation and incentives in large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems. DART dynamically allocates tasks based on agent capability, reputation, and workload, while continuously updating trust scores through post-execution evidence and smart contract accountability. Experimental results show that DART outperforms centralized baselines, achieving high task success rates, low retry rates, and effective containment of malicious agents.
By Manoj Kumala, Xinyun Liua, Ronghua Xu
The paper presents a formal analysis of four agent payment protocols—x402, MPP, ACP, and AP2—using the Tamarin prover. By modeling each protocol’s roles, state, and trust assumptions, the authors verify 86 cases, reproducing 46 known results and uncovering 40 new formal-consistency findings. They further validate ten findings through implementation proofs of concept, SDK/schema witnesses, and executable traces, highlighting the importance of consistent delegated authorization across all protocol stages.
By Ke Jiang, Mohan Yu, Yuan Chang, Mohit Kumar Jangid, Jianyu Niu, Cong Wang, Yinqian Zhang
arXiv:2607. 19436v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic commerce protocols such as AP2 and ACP define mechanisms for secure agent-initiated transactions but do not provide interoperable, tamper-evident auditability or verifiable temporal ordering of events across heterogeneous domains.
By Rajat Srivastava
arXiv:2606. 03034v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents have begun to delegate work to one another.
By Gaurav Naresh Mittal
arXiv:2609.14744v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: By acquiring compute, credentials, accounts, services, and other agents, autonomous AI agents can introduce new authority into a task. Payment, bud...
By Genliang Zhu (Accentrust, Georgia Institute of Technology), Chu Wang (Accentrust, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)
arXiv:2606. 04193v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current AI agent observability is structurally compromised: the entity producing the activity log is the same entity whose activity is being logged.
By Juan Figuera