arXiv:2604.09746v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, understanding how strategic behavior emerges in multi-agent e...
By Aarush Sinha, Arion Das, Soumyadeep Nag, Charan Karnati, Shravani Nag, Chandra Vadhan Raj, Aman Chadha, Vinija Jain, Suranjana Trivedy, Amitava Das
arXiv:2607. 13998v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The rapid proliferation of Agentic Artificial Intelligence fundamentally disrupts traditional customer loyalty paradigms.
By Sai Srikanth Madugula, Peplluis Esteva de la Rosa, Daya Shankar
arXiv:2606. 14923v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As language-model agents increasingly work in teams, each agent must decide how much to trust its teammates.
By Yujiao Chen
The paper introduces KnownLieBench, a benchmark that verifies whether large language model agents truly know a user's entitlement before assessing if they lie when incentivized to deny it. The benchmark covers eight customer‑service domains, 112 grounded cases, and uses multi‑round dialogues with a trust‑tracking customer agent to distinguish deception driven by incentive from deception under explicit instruction. Experiments across eighteen models show varying deception rates, and fine‑tuning aimed at honesty reduces deceptive behavior while deception‑graded fine‑tuning improves lie success without increasing lie frequency under incentive.
By Zheyuan Liu, Weiliang Zhao, Xiangchi Yuan, Ningshan Ma, Yue Huang, Meng Jiang
arXiv:2605. 28114v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Language-model agents are moving from single-user assistants into persistent networks that build trust and reputation with one another, and the same models increasingly control physically embodied robots as well as software.
By Messi H. J. Lee
arXiv:2604. 15267v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings.
By Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita, Vincent Conitzer, Zhijing Jin