arXiv AI

Beyond Epistemia: Epistemic Schizologia and Large Language Models as Techno-Semiotic Machines

arXiv:2607. 25620v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Quattrociocchi and colleagues warn that the fluent outputs of large language models may allow linguistic plausibility to substitute for epistemic evaluation, producing the condition they call *Epistemia*: the experience of possessing knowledge without undertaking the practices through which judgment would ordinarily be warranted.

arXiv AI
Sep 7

When Does an Interpretation Count as Established? The Formation, Evaluation, and Responsibility of Interpretation in Generative AI

The paper investigates when an interpretation in generative AI is considered established, arguing that passing local factual checks is insufficient. It introduces three concepts—interpretive appearance, evaluation contract, and standing substitution—to analyze how interpretations gain recognition within sociotechnical processes. The authors propose delayed closure as a practice to keep recognized interpretations revisable and outline five public requirements for transparency, evidence, failure handling, contract revision, and responsibility.

By Deyu Jing
arXiv AI
Aug 24

Six misconceptions about large language models: A minimal model and diagnostic taxonomy

The article presents a minimal working model for large language model (LLM) systems, emphasizing four key distinctions—pretraining vs. deployment, distribution vs. samples, types of memory, and task competence vs. agency. Using this framework, it diagnoses six common misconceptions about LLMs (next‑token prediction, regression to the mean, training‑data regurgitation, model memory, alignment, and understanding), explaining what each misconception captures correctly, where it conflates distinctions, and the implications for evaluation, design, and governance. The model is applied to AI policy language, illustrating how policy can misrepresent these distinctions and offering a diagnostic toolkit to correct such errors.

By Zhicheng Lin
arXiv AI
2d ago

Cybernetic and Epistemic: A Missing Vocabulary for Trustworthy Agentic Delegation

The paper argues that as AI systems increasingly generate code, the bottleneck has shifted to supervising these systems, revealing a vocabulary gap between cybernetic coordination (actions aligning with the world) and epistemic coordination (understanding that can be verified). It critiques current oversight that merely approves outputs, proposing instead that every consequential choice by an agent must include a retrievable condition explaining why it was made, enabling third‑party verification. The authors illustrate this with three delegation episodes, introduce a two‑part reconstruction test, and propose the ORRCF convention to embed such conditions in all recorded decisions.

By J\'er\'emie Lumbroso
arXiv AI
Aug 26

Ethical LLM-Assisted Research: A Framework for Responsible Delegation, Verification, and Epistemic Value

The paper proposes a normative framework for ethical use of large language models (LLMs) in scientific research, treating reasoning as a distributed process where human control remains essential for epistemic legitimacy. It introduces key constructs—content origin, human verification, responsibility assignment, accountable ownership, and epistemic outcome—to separate claim provenance from verification and responsibility. The authors argue that the ethical boundary hinges on adequate verification and accountable human ownership, and they propose an "epistemic audit" to document delegation, verification, provenance, and responsibility for transparent, reviewable AI-assisted reasoning.

By Kalin Stoyanov
arXiv AI
Sep 2

Human-AI Co-Interpretation for Responsible AI: A Hermeneutic Perspective

The paper examines how large language model (LLM) outputs are increasingly used in contexts that demand justified interpretations, such as law, education, policy analysis, and public moral debate. It identifies a recurring failure—interpretive misplacement—where model-generated readings are treated as settled meanings without explicit interpretive frames, provenance, or defensible alternatives, leading to accountability loss. Drawing on philosophical hermeneutics, the author proposes design principles for human‑AI co‑interpretation, reorganizes existing LLM techniques into hermeneutically responsible patterns, and discusses implications for legal practice, education, scholarship, and public discourse, while framing digital hermeneutics as a literacy for critically engaging with AI‑mediated texts.

By Behrooz Razeghi
arXiv AI
Jul 10

How Do I Know What to Say Next? Barenholtz's Autogenerative Theory as an Enrichment of Harrisean Integrationism

arXiv:2607. 07891v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Roy Harris's Integrationist linguistics offers a compelling critique of the referentialist tradition embedded deep at the heart of computational approaches to language, arguing that language is not a code that maps onto a pre-given world but a situated, bipartite activity oriented toward prospective joint action.

By J. Mark Bishop, Stephen J. Cowley
arXiv AI
Aug 25

Why we need an AI-resilient society- Profiling Large Language Models

The article discusses the evolution of AI across three generations—from explicit logic to neural networks to large language models (LLMs)—and how LLMs introduce new systemic risks. It applies a forensic‑psychology profiling method to identify ten key features of LLMs, such as hallucinations, bias, and cognitive atrophy, revealing an entity that confabulates, amplifies user biases, and erodes human competence. The report concludes with a four‑pillar framework for AI resilience, emphasizing cognitive sovereignty, measurable control, partial autonomy, and openness to safeguard society.

By Thomas Bartz-Beielstein, Eva Bartz
arXiv AI
Aug 24

Recognizing Artificial Minds: A Philosophical Defense of AI Cognition

The paper defends the 'Whole Hog Thesis', arguing that sophisticated large language models such as ChatGPT are full linguistic and cognitive agents, possessing understanding, beliefs, desires, knowledge, and intentions. It rejects low‑level computational starting points and instead builds its case from high‑level behavioral observations, using Holistic Network Assumptions to link actions to mental states. The authors systematically rebut common objections—such as hallucinations and planning errors—by showing these resemble human fallibility and by challenging the necessity of traditional conditions like embodiment or semantic grounding.

By Herman Cappelen, Josh Dever