arXiv:2606. 15369v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study repeated bilateral trade from a fairness perspective.
We study repeated bilateral trade from a fairness perspective. At each round, a fresh seller-buyer pair arrives, and the platform posts a price before observing the traders' valuations.
arXiv:2606. 01159v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study two-player zero-sum games (TPZSGs) with bandit feedback under fairness constraints requiring every action to be played with probability at least $\alpha/m$.
arXiv:2607. 20694v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Personal and organizational planning systems maintain two records that drift apart: what was planned (a task's effort budget) and what was done (a logged action's duration and description).
arXiv:2606. 19883v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study a multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem in the competitive setup with two-sided matching markets under a human centric decision making model.
arXiv:2503. 01701v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Most microeconomic models of interest involve optimizing a piecewise linear function.
arXiv:2607. 13402v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In bandit problems, standard regret-minimizing algorithms treat exploration as an amortized cost, which can expose early participants to unfair ex-ante losses in settings such as clinical trials.
arXiv:2606. 29252v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study repeated bidding in multi-unit discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for a single bidder with per-round utility equal to value minus $\alpha$ times payment, where $\alpha\in[0,1]$ is a cost-of-capital parameter.
In bandit problems, standard regret-minimizing algorithms treat exploration as an amortized cost, which can expose early participants to unfair ex-ante losses in settings such as clinical trials. Recent work addresses this by evaluating the sequence of per-round expected rewards through the generalized $p$-mean, interpolating between utilitarian welfare ($p=1$), Nash welfare ($p\to0$), and Rawlsian fairness ($p\to-\infty$).
arXiv:2608. 09389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond.
arXiv:2605. 01961v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Learning from human preference data is becoming a useful tool, from fine-tuning large language models to training reinforcement learning agents.
arXiv:2506. 03802v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We introduce a learning problem in a generalized two-sided matching market, where agents select actions to interact with their match.
We study repeated bidding in multi-unit discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for a single bidder with per-round utility equal to value minus $α$ times payment, where $α\in[0,1]$ is a cost-of-capital parameter. The bidder aims to maximize cumulative utility over $T$ rounds subject to a total budget $B$.