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Hugging Face Trending Papers June 13, 2026

Repeated Bilateral Trade: The Quest for Fairness

Read the original on Hugging Face Trending Papers →

We study repeated bilateral trade from a fairness perspective. At each round, a fresh seller-buyer pair arrives, and the platform posts a price before observing the traders' valuations.

Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at Hugging Face Trending Papers.

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