We study repeated bilateral trade from a fairness perspective. At each round, a fresh seller-buyer pair arrives, and the platform posts a price before observing the traders' valuations.
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arXiv:2606. 15369v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study repeated bilateral trade from a fairness perspective.
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We study repeated bidding in multi-unit discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for a single bidder with per-round utility equal to value minus $α$ times payment, where $α\in[0,1]$ is a cost-of-capital parameter. The bidder aims to maximize cumulative utility over $T$ rounds subject to a total budget $B$.
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arXiv:2602.04125v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Modern digital platforms use contextual bandits to allocate valuable exposure and opportunities among competing participants. Fair treatment...
arXiv:2606. 29252v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study repeated bidding in multi-unit discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for a single bidder with per-round utility equal to value minus $\alpha$ times payment, where $\alpha\in[0,1]$ is a cost-of-capital parameter.