arXiv:2607. 01859v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety training for large language models (LLMs) is conducted predominantly in English, leaving uncertain how well safety mechanisms generalize to low-resource languages and mixed-language code-switching.
By Joshua Adrian Cahyono
Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) is largely developed in English, assuming these safeguards generalize across multilingual settings. However, this assumption remains underexplored and exposes a vulnerability in low-resource languages.
arXiv:2606. 05958v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Activation steering has become a popular way to control Large Language Model (LLM) behavior without fine-tuning.
By Abzal Aidakhmetov, Donato Crisostomi, Tommaso Mencattini, Adrian Robert Minut, Iacopo Masi, Emanuele Rodol\`a
arXiv:2607. 10112v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety alignment in large language models remains brittle across languages: prompts reliably refused in English can elicit harmful compliance in non-English and low-resource settings.
By Chigozirim Ifebi, Brent Kong, Ayushi Mehrotra
arXiv:2606. 07706v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have demonstrated strong performance across multimodal tasks, yet their safety robustness remains an open challenge.
By Rishabh Makwana, Mamta, Deeksha Varshney, Oana Cocarascu
arXiv:2609.38389v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks that circumvent safety alignment to elicit harmful outputs. It remains unclear...
By Yelyzaveta (Lisa), Husieva, Lauren Alvarez
Safety training for large language models (LLMs) is conducted predominantly in English, leaving uncertain how well safety mechanisms generalize to low-resource languages and mixed-language code-switching. We show that this creates an epistemic gap in which models confidently generate harmful responses for inputs that fall outside the distribution of their safety training.
The study investigates how safety alignment in large language models, trained mainly in English, transfers to other languages. While models show near-perfect harmfulness detection (AUROC > 0.98) using unrelated harmless prompts (easy negatives), performance drops sharply in low‑resource languages when using surface‑similar benign prompts (hard negatives). This degradation persists across multiple languages and models, indicating that easy‑negative evaluation alone cannot confirm cross‑lingual harmfulness representation quality.
By Paras Balani, Subhrakanta Panda
arXiv:2606. 01196v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety alignment learned in high-resource languages transfers poorly to low-resource languages.
By Rashad Aziz, Ikhlasul Akmal Hanif, Fajri Koto
arXiv:2605. 17173v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models exhibit safety degradation in non-English languages.
By Max Zhang, Ameen Patel, Sang T. Truong, Sanmi Koyejo
PRISM is a framework that evaluates how activation interventions transfer across precision, languages, and model scales to mitigate unsafe tool‑calling behaviors in language models. By leveraging lower‑resource settings such as quantized NF4 labels and cross‑lingual transfer, PRISM demonstrates that alignment improvements can be achieved with minimal scenarios and that these gains transfer to held‑out languages and larger models. The study shows that auxiliary supervision from compressed models and multilingual data can effectively uncover and reduce hazardous tool‑calling behaviors across different model families.
By Giovana Kerche Bon\'as, Thales Sales Almeida, Marcelo da Silva Reis, Rodrigo Nogueira, Marcos Meideiros Raimundo
arXiv:2512. 14751v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Finetuning pretrained large language models (LLMs) has become the standard paradigm for developing downstream applications.
By Yixin Tan, Zhe Yu, Rui Wen, Jun Sakuma