arXiv:2608. 05045v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Released aligned large language models remain vulnerable to malicious downstream finetuning.
arXiv:2607. 01859v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety training for large language models (LLMs) is conducted predominantly in English, leaving uncertain how well safety mechanisms generalize to low-resource languages and mixed-language code-switching.
arXiv:2508. 10029v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models can still be manipulated through white-box interventions that modify their internal representations.
arXiv:2606. 28962v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Model quantization is essential for the efficient deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs), but introduces a critical vulnerability: Quantization-Conditioned Backdoor (QCB) attacks.
Safety training for large language models (LLMs) is conducted predominantly in English, leaving uncertain how well safety mechanisms generalize to low-resource languages and mixed-language code-switching. We show that this creates an epistemic gap in which models confidently generate harmful responses for inputs that fall outside the distribution of their safety training.
arXiv:2512. 14751v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Finetuning pretrained large language models (LLMs) has become the standard paradigm for developing downstream applications.
arXiv:2606. 05958v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Activation steering has become a popular way to control Large Language Model (LLM) behavior without fine-tuning.
arXiv:2609.05794v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Open-weight large language models face a low-cost white-box threat from representation engineering attacks. Attackers can estimate refusal directions...
arXiv:2606. 29441v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Inference-time safety methods for large language models have proliferated, yet no systematic comparison exists.
arXiv:2602. 06911v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As increasingly capable open-weight large language models (LLMs) are deployed, improving their tamper resistance against unsafe modifications, whether accidental or intentional, becomes critical to minimize risks.
arXiv:2609.36570v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection makes an LLM agent treat untrusted retrieved text as instructions. We present CounterSteer, an inference-time defense that...
Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where hidden triggers induce malicious outputs. Existing defenses generally fall into inference-time detection or training-time mitigation, but face two key limitations.
The paper introduces FDCU, a dual‑constrained subspace projection framework designed to improve machine unlearning for large language models. FDCU limits parameter updates with a dual‑masking rule that preserves general knowledge via Fisher Information while preventing the activation of spurious suppressors through the Principle of Minimal Functional Intervention. Experiments show that FDCU achieves state‑of‑the‑art robustness against retraining attacks while maintaining near‑lossless general utility, thereby ensuring durable safety for LLMs.