arXiv:2606. 26793v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multimodal agentic retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems expand the attack surface beyond prompt injection to include text poisoning, image injection, direct-query attacks, and orchestrator-level tool manipulation.
arXiv:2510. 00586v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Existing data poisoning attacks on retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems scale poorly because they require costly optimization of poisoned documents for each target phrase.
arXiv:2604. 08304v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) extends large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge, but this access path also introduces security risks that existing work often conflates with inherent LLM flaws.
arXiv:2606. 10742v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: External memory has become a core component of modern web agents, enabling long-horizon reasoning through the retrieval of past experiences.
arXiv:2608. 12847v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval can identify a past trajectory that may matter, yet it does not specify how an acting agent should use that trajectory after users, entities, constraints, or environment state have changed.
arXiv:2606. 15609v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on long-term memory to support complex task execution, user personalization, and domain adaptation.
arXiv:2606. 12703v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) agents increasingly run with persistent memory that accumulates across user sessions.
arXiv:2606. 05784v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We identify and formally characterize credit misassignment as a systematic failure mode of GRPO in tool-augmented multimodal search agents: its uniform broadcast of trajectory-level advantages to all tokens causes valuable tool-use steps in failing trajectories to be penalized no differently from valueless ones.
arXiv:2604. 12616v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Vision-Language Models (VLMs) expand the attack surface of safety-aligned systems by coupling visual perception with text generation.
arXiv:2606. 22338v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Robots deployed in realistic settings will accumulate experience across many sessions and tasks over their deployment.
arXiv:2606. 18310v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Injecting malicious knowledge into retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems can manipulate retrieved evidence and mislead downstream generation, posing a serious security threat for AI applications.
arXiv:2607. 11698v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Production LLM agents such as Claude Code and Codex operate over untrusted content, files, commands, and workspace state, making safety failures directly actionable.
arXiv:2608. 04565v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based search agents are widely used for information-seeking tasks, but their reliance on external tool returns introduces a critical security risk: web content retrieved during execution is untrusted, exposing agents to prompt injection and goal hijacking.