arXiv:2607. 25890v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI coding agents are being adopted at historic speed, yet security and risk concerns remain the primary barrier to scaling agentic AI across organizations.
AI coding agents are being adopted at historic speed, yet security and risk concerns remain the primary barrier to scaling agentic AI across organizations. Existing security controls for coding agents are not systematically distributed to engineering teams, and vendor-native solutions introduce ecosystem dependencies that may not suit every deployment context.
arXiv:2603. 02277v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as autonomous agents, using tools to execute code, read and write files, and access networks, creating novel security risks.
arXiv:2607. 05743v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe.
Recent advances in persistent personal-agent frameworks are making human-centered agent networks realistic deployment targets: each user can be served by an AI agent that acts on the user's behalf, maintains state, and communicates with other agents through social and task relations. In these networks, everyday tool use becomes multi-party owned-agent collaboration over personal workspaces, where files, records, tools, and policies are not directly visible across owners.
arXiv:2608. 03499v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent advances in persistent personal-agent frameworks are making human-centered agent networks realistic deployment targets: each user can be served by an AI agent that acts on the user's behalf, maintains state, and communicates with other agents through social and task relations.
arXiv:2606. 03907v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic AI coding tools write code with increasing autonomy and in doing so decide when to import a library and when to implement functionality from scratch.
arXiv:2604. 14228v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Claude Code is an agentic coding tool that can run shell commands, edit files, and call external services on behalf of the user.
AgentKernel proposes a trust‑native operating system for AI agents, arguing that current governance layers are insufficient because they share the same process trust boundary as the agents. The OS introduces a mandatory enforcement boundary organized into four pillars—Identity, Perception, Cognition, and Execution—each adapting classical OS security principles to address semantic‑level failures such as prompt injection, memory poisoning, and tool misuse. By wrapping the agent lifecycle in this structured, non‑bypassable framework, AgentKernel aims to provide a unified security layer that can enforce identity, input mediation, memory governance, and execution control across the entire agent lifecycle.
GatewayBench is a new evaluation framework that systematically studies how the design of Model Context Protocol (MCP) gateways influences AI agent capability, efficiency, and security. It categorizes gateways into flattened and hierarchical architectures and tests them on 524 tasks across six domains using a pool of 11,118 real-world tools from 251 MCP servers, including task-irrelevant tools to simulate large-scale deployments. Experiments on seven widely deployed gateways reveal significant differences in task completion, tool-use efficiency, and attack resilience, showing strong interactions with the underlying model and agent harness.
arXiv:2606. 19380v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Software engineering and deployment are increasingly delegated to AI coding agents.
Pincer is a defense mechanism for coding agents that operates at the resource layer, complementing existing tool‑call defenses. It uses a digital twin—an isolated‑context model that learns and enforces dynamic, user‑specific least‑privilege policies—to act as a proxy for the agent’s permission requests. The authors introduce a user‑centric dataset to emulate the learning phase and demonstrate that Pincer outperforms several baselines in both security and utility, especially against adversarial attack types.