arXiv AI By Mayank Rathee, Alexander Stepanov, Shalin Madabhavi, Jinhao Zhu, Raluca Ada Popa, Ion Stoica

Pincer: Resource Authorization for Agents using a Digital Twin

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Pincer is a defense mechanism for coding agents that operates at the resource layer, complementing existing tool‑call defenses. It uses a digital twin—an isolated‑context model that learns and enforces dynamic, user‑specific least‑privilege policies—to act as a proxy for the agent’s permission requests. The authors introduce a user‑centric dataset to emulate the learning phase and demonstrate that Pincer outperforms several baselines in both security and utility, especially against adversarial attack types.

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