Vision-language-model-based embodied agents can complete instructed tasks but often violate safety constraints in the process, a problem recently framed as interactive safety. Training such agents to act safely is difficult, since safety and task success are distinct objectives, and safety arises only at a small number of safety-critical steps within a trajectory.
arXiv:2608. 19729v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Vision-language-model-based embodied agents can complete instructed tasks but often violate safety constraints in the process, a problem recently framed as interactive safety.
arXiv:2607. 14543v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly used as the reasoning backbone of embodied agents, enabling robots to interpret visual scenes, follow language instructions, and plan multi-step actions.
arXiv:2607. 16247v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: While Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have empowered embodied agents to execute complex household tasks, they struggle to proactively handle dynamically emerging hazards during closed-loop interactions.
arXiv:2606. 05805v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-based guardrails typically safeguard agents by evaluating proposed actions or inputs before execution, producing safety signals such as binary allow/deny decisions, risk categories, and/or explanatory rationales about potential policy violations.
arXiv:2608.21928v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In embodied AI, safety risk can be latent: a benign instruction and a safe scene become hazardous only when composed. Prior work has advanced embodied...
arXiv:2606. 05290v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recent progress in generative modeling has made safety control a central challenge, yet existing approaches remain largely model-specific, requiring retraining or tailored interventions for each new architecture.
arXiv:2608. 09885v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The safety of large language model (LLM) agents depends not only on model weights but also on the agent harness that manages context, memory, tools, permissions, and runtime control.
arXiv:2607. 16242v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Fine-Tuning-as-a-Service (FTaaS) platforms let users train large language models (LLMs) on customized tasks, but this pipeline could erode models' safety alignment.
SafeEvolve is an experience-driven framework that co‑evolves a harness and policy to align large‑language‑model agents with safety goals. It uses completed on‑policy trajectories to update safety prompts and hierarchical skills, then applies a two‑stage SFT‑RL training loop that bootstraps the policy with the evolved harness and refines it through verifier‑augmented rewards. Experiments on agentic safety benchmarks show that SafeEvolve improves the safety‑utility tradeoff, achieving a three‑fold reduction in ASR on AgentDojo for Qwen3.5‑4B while increasing benign utility from 59.79% to 61.86%.
arXiv:2510. 12985v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We present SENTINEL, a framework for formally evaluating the physical safety of foundation model (FM)-based embodied agents.
arXiv:2607. 00218v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vision-language models (VLMs) are now proposed as runtime safety guards for embodied agents in homes and factories.
The performance of LLM-based agents is jointly shaped by the base model and the harness used when interacting with the environment. This exposes them to safety risks in both harmful final responses an...