arXiv:2605. 10807v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into Electronic Design Automation (EDA) and hardware security is rapidly reshaping the semiconductor industry.
By Johann Knechtel, Ozgur Sinanoglu, Ramesh Karri
The paper proposes a neurosymbolic defense architecture for AI-enhanced Security Operations Centers (AI‑SOCs) that protects against indirect prompt injection via log poisoning. It combines deterministic SIEM decoders as a pre‑filter with NeMo Guardrails for semantic validation, and adds a closed‑loop telemetry system for Human‑in‑the‑Loop visibility. Experimental results mapped to the MITRE ATLAS taxonomy show the approach effectively dismantles promptware kill chains and delivers a resilient, observable defense for next‑generation AI‑SOCs.
By Anna Gazani, Spyridon Kounoupidis, Panagiotis Katsaros, Nikolaos Kekatos, Grigorios Tsoumakas, Georgios Koutidis
arXiv:2606. 19535v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive settings such as software engineering, where their outputs directly shape downstream artifacts.
By Nils Loose, Jonas Sander, Felix M\"achtle, Thomas Eisenbarth
arXiv:2606. 19387v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in software development.
By You Li, Samuel Mandell, David Z. Pan
arXiv:2603. 09046v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Device-side Large Language Models (LLMs) have witnessed explosive growth, offering higher privacy and availability compared to cloud-side LLMs.
By Yinpeng Wu, Yitong Chen, Lixiang Wang, Jinyu Gu, Zhichao Hua, Yubin Xia
arXiv:2507. 15104v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Recent advances in generative AI (GenAI) have shown transformative potential for modern hardware design.
By Qiufeng Li, Shu Hong, Tian Lan, Weidong Cao
arXiv:2607. 23088v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely used for code generation, yet their security behavior in realistic development workflows remains underexplored.
By Lixun Ma, Ruolong Ma, Bei Wang, Feng Wei, Zhenguang Liu, Lorenzo Cavallaro, Wentao Chen
arXiv:2608. 06130v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents performing cryptographic operations (signing Git commits, authenticating API calls, issuing certificates) currently store private keys in software-accessible locations: plaintext files, environment variables, or container memory.
By Leo Sambrook, Sampo Sovio
arXiv:2602. 04894v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLMs are increasingly used for code generation, but their outputs often follow recurring templates that can induce predictable vulnerabilities.
By Tomer Kordonsky, Amit LeVi, Maayan Yamin, Noam Benzimra, Avi Mendelson
arXiv:2605.01970v4 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Memory systems enable otherwise stateless LLM agents to persist user information across sessions, but also introduce a new attack surface. Th...
By Debeshee Das, Julien Piet, Darya Kaviani, Luca Beurer-Kellner, Florian Tram\`er, David Wagner
arXiv:2607. 20723v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This work presents LeakyLMs, a set of attacks that leak proprietary model, architecture, and deployment information from production language models.
By Sadegh Majidi, Niloofar Mireshghallah, Kazem Taram
The paper discusses hardware Trojan threats to Multi-Chiplet Photonic Neural Network Accelerators (MCPNAs), which combine photonic computation, communication, and heterogeneous chiplet integration for scalable, energy‑efficient AI acceleration. It highlights that the distributed architecture and use of third‑party chiplets create significant hardware security risks. The study examines these threats across confidentiality, integrity, and availability dimensions.
By Sudeep Pasricha