Sapien is a policy engine that enforces stateful contextual policies for autonomous AI agents, specifying allowed tool‑call sequences with an extended regular expression that includes stateful predicates, deferred policy generation, and scoped semantic checks. The system maintains performance close to an unconstrained agent while significantly reducing malicious actions, ruling out 93‑95% of attacks on AgentDojo and 62‑85% on Toolathlon, outperforming traditional tool allowlists on long‑horizon tasks.
By Corinn Tiffany, Wen Zhang, Eugene Bagdasarian, Lillian Tsai
arXiv:2609.00015v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: AI agents powered by large language models are evolving from isolated assistants into heterogeneous systems in which multiple agents, planners, control...
By Dongsheng Chen, Xiangyu Zhao, Xin Yao, Xuetao Wei
arXiv:2609.35807v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: LLM agents can make unsafe tool calls even when instructed to behave safely. Existing defenses constrain agents before execution, modify tool inputs/...
By Charlie Summers, Prajwal Raghunath, Aaditya Pai, Mayur Kulkarni, Zhuo Zhang, Oliver Kennedy, Eugene Wu
arXiv:2606. 20510v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Securing AI agents that operate in complex digital environments has become a critical need, and runtime monitoring approaches that formulate and enforce policies expressed in a formal language like Datalog offer a promising solution.
By Alaia Solko-Breslin, Pramod Kaushik Mudrakarta, Mihai Christodorescu, Somesh Jha, Krishnamurthy Dj Dvijotham
ActGov is a runtime enforcement framework that validates each action proposed by a large language model (LLM) agent before it interacts with external tools, ensuring that actions stay within task‑scoped authorization boundaries and comply with dynamically constructed policies. It builds policies from tool specifications, benign tasks, and failure traces, verifying updates via SMT‑based counterexample checking. In evaluations on AgentDojo and AgentDyn benchmarks, ActGov consistently reduces indirect prompt‑injection attack success while maintaining task utility, outperforming existing defenses.
By Kaiyuan Zhang, Yuke Peng, Ke Jiang, Yinqian Zhang
arXiv:2601.12449v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: AI agents are autonomous systems that combine LLMs with external tools to solve complex tasks. While such tools extend capability, improper t...
By Roy Betser, Amit Giloni, Shamik Bose, Sindhu Padakandla, Chiara Picardi, Lidor Erez, Roman Vainshtein
arXiv:2606. 02302v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous LLM agents increasingly operate in stateful environments where they access tools, files, memory, and external services.
By Hao Cheng, Changtao Miao, Tianle Song, Yin Wu, He Liu, Erjia Xiao, Junchi Chen, Xiaoyu Shi, Yichi Wang, Jing Yang, Taowen Wang, Jinhao Duan, Mengshu Sun, Peiyan Dong, Xuan Shen, Yang Cao, Renjing Xu, Kaidi Xu, Jindong Gu, Bo Zhang, Jize Zhang, Chenhao Lin, Philip Torr, Chao Shen
Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly execute long-horizon workflows through external tools, allowing untrusted outputs to influence subsequent actions and exceed user authorization. Existing...
arXiv:2608. 13574v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly operate as execution systems that invoke tools, modify local state, use persistent memory, and interact with external protocols.
By Bo Jin, Qiang Jiao, Xin Tong
VEPA is a framework that enables the verified evolution of formal guardrails for lifelong large language model agents. It represents guardrails as formal policies of symbolic rules over typed agent events, and during deployment uses LLM‑guided feedback to propose policy patches that fix new failures while preserving correct behavior. A deterministic verifier accepts only structurally valid, conflict‑free policies, and an evidence‑aware authority layer activates verified rules only when sufficient supporting evidence exists, ensuring that uncertain updates do not directly affect guardrail decisions.
By Duy Nguyen, Lesly Miculicich, Bhavana Dalvi Mishra, Shuo Li, Krishnamurthy Dj Dvijotham, Mohit Bansal, Tomas Pfister, Long T. Le
arXiv:2608. 11274v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI.
By Albus W. Ng, Yi Han, Jusheng Zhang, Wenhao Wang
arXiv:2606. 24496v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The use of agentic systems to perform offensive security operations has moved from a theoretical possibility to a commoditized capability.
By Dario Pasquini, Michal Bazyli, Taras Fedynyshyn, Artem Sorokin