arXiv:2508.04800v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: We introduce a novel privatization framework for high-dimensional controlled variable selection. Our framework enables rigorous False Discove...
By Yuxuan Tao, Adel Javanmard
arXiv:2601. 17360v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: An adversary observing a model's released prediction can infer sensitive attributes of the queried input, or even reconstruct representatives of the model's training data.
By Jiankai Jin, Xiangzheng Zhang, Zhao Liu, Wenzhuo Xu, Dongdong Yang, Deyue Zhang, Quanchen Zou
arXiv:2503. 10945v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Current practices for reporting differential privacy (DP) guarantees for machine learning (ML) algorithms such as DP-SGD provide an incomplete and potentially misleading picture.
By Juan Felipe Gomez, Bogdan Kulynych, Georgios Kaissis, Flavio P. Calmon, Jamie Hayes, Borja Balle, Antti Honkela
The paper compares four audit methods for assessing identity‑level differential privacy in pre‑trained, black‑box face generators. Each method—GaussMech, KDE‑LR, MMD‑TV, and ROC‑HT—has distinct assumptions, hyperparameters, and finite‑sample limitations, and they produce markedly different epsilon estimates when applied to FaceFusion and InstantID. The study finds that all methods reveal significant identity distinguishability, but none can be reliably ranked in this high‑distinguishability regime, suggesting that future work should evaluate them on partially private mechanisms.
By Arman Zareian Jahromi, Vishnu Bondalakunta, Mohammad Akbar Bin Shah, Naimul Haque, Shuangqing Wei, George T. Amariucai
arXiv:2606. 00152v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based agents are rapidly advancing, autonomously invoking external tools to complete multi-step tasks for users.
By Mingxuan Zhang, Jiahui Han, Dadi Guo, Songze Li, Guanchu Wang, Na Zou, Dongrui Liu, Xia Hu
arXiv:2602. 17284v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We consider the privacy amplification properties of a sampling scheme in which a user's data isused in $k$ steps chosen randomly and uniformly from a sequence (or set) of $t$ steps.
By Vitaly Feldman, Moshe Shenfeld
arXiv:2606.14518v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: The removal of learned data from Machine Learning models through Machine Unlearning (MU) has been widely studied; however, there is no agreed-upon...
By Liou Tang, James Joshi, Ashish Kundu
The paper introduces Fulcrum, a topology‑aware differential privacy scheme for hierarchical federated learning that allocates noise based on the size and exposure of regional aggregation groups. By deriving a closed‑form exposure dispersion metric from region structure and weights, the method optimally balances privacy and utility, achieving up to 14.84% accuracy gains on image tasks and 12.16% on text tasks at ε = 0.99 compared to uniform noise allocation. The approach ensures each participant receives noise commensurate with its actual exposure, eliminating unnecessary privacy overhead.
By Murtaza Rangwala, Richard O. Sinnott, Rajkumar Buyya
arXiv:2606. 04384v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Machine learning's reliance on sensitive data necessitates privacy-preserving techniques like Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DPSGD).
By Xiaobo Huang, Fang Xie
arXiv:2605. 07674v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Regulatory audits of AI systems increasingly rely on differential privacy (DP) to protect training data and model internals.
By Florian A. D. Burnat
The paper investigates how federated unlearning systems that broadcast updated linear classifiers after each client update can inadvertently leak the compact, additive summaries used for deletion. By submitting known changes and analyzing the returned classifiers, an attacker can recover the deleted sample’s class or even reinstate it. Experiments on MNIST and CIFAR‑10 show that high‑precision broadcasts enable exact label recovery, while lower precision limits fine‑grained recovery and diverse responses can prevent identification.
By Yijun Quan, Giovanni Montana
arXiv:2608. 07914v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Behavioral contamination detectors can return "no evidence" either because a benchmark is clean or because the audit has little power.
By Ibne Farabi Shihab, Sanjeda Akter, Anuj Sharma