The paper proposes using lossy compression as a security signal in federated learning by defining a "compression footprint"—a low‑dimensional set of statistics derived from the compressor’s output. It introduces CRAFT, a server‑side aggregation method that leverages these footprints to distinguish honest from malicious updates without extra client metadata or knowledge of attacker numbers. Experiments on six attacks and datasets show CRAFT often outperforms existing robust aggregation baselines, demonstrating that compression can simultaneously reduce communication and enhance security.
By Sachi Shome, William Eiers
arXiv:2603. 12977v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Foundation models are commonly deployed as frozen feature extractors with a small trainable head to adapt to private, user-generated data in federated settings.
By Yijun Quan, Wentai Wu, Giovanni Montana
The paper introduces LLM‑Attack Suite, a unified framework for evaluating privacy risks in split and distributed large language models. It records attacker choices—such as message types, model weights, datasets, and recovery metrics—to enable consistent comparison and extension of privacy evaluations. Experiments on GPT‑2 demonstrate that providing gradients during training significantly boosts token and document recovery rates, illustrating how attacker access levels influence privacy outcomes.
By Georgios Politis, Evangelos Pappas
arXiv:2606. 02563v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Heterogeneous Differential Privacy (HDP) in Federated Learning (FL) allows clients to select individual privacy budgets ($\varepsilon_i$) according to institutional policies and data sensitivity.
By Farhin Farhad Riya, Olivera Kotevska, Jinyuan Stella Sun
The paper introduces LLM‑Attacker, a unified framework for evaluating privacy risks in split and distributed large language models. It records attacker choices—such as message types, model weights, datasets, and recovery metrics—to enable consistent comparison and extension of privacy evaluations. Experiments on GPT‑2 show that providing training gradients boosts token recovery from 94.20% to 97.38% and exact‑document recovery from 13.71% to 37.77%, illustrating the framework’s ability to quantify how changes in attacker access affect privacy outcomes.
By Georgios Politis, Evangelos Pappas
arXiv:2409. 01062v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Model Inversion (MI) attacks pose a significant privacy threat by reconstructing private training data from machine learning models.
By Viet-Hung Tran, Ngoc-Bao Nguyen, Son T. Mai, Hans Vandierendonck, Ira Assent, Alex Kot, Ngai-Man Cheung
FedLNS is a server‑side framework that screens federated learning updates by representing each client’s contribution through changes in trainable normalization‑layer parameters, creating lightweight signatures that can be compared against a history‑aware cross‑client reference. The method requires no extra client‑to‑server communication, raw data, or labeled attack examples, and after screening, the remaining full‑model updates are aggregated with standard federated learning rules. Experiments on GPT‑style, BERT‑style, and LLaMA‑style models with 200 clients demonstrate that FedLNS achieves lower test perplexity than six baselines even when 40% of the population performs target manipulation under both IID and non‑IID data partitions.
By Kai Li, Jong-Ik Park, Carlee Joe-Wong, Wei Ni, Falko Dressler
arXiv:2610.31995v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) face growing demands for data removal driven by regulatory compliance, copyright concerns, and privacy protection, ap...
By Mengying Zhang, Derui Wang, Ibrahim Khalil, Bowen Liu, Xiaoyu Xia, Minhui Xue
arXiv:2511.10936v3 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Graph unlearning (GU) has emerged as a promising solution to comply with "the right to be forgotten" regulations by enabling the removal of s...
By Ying Song, Balaji Palanisamy
arXiv:2606. 08372v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Synthetic data is increasingly promoted as a privacy-preserving substitute for releasing sensitive tabular records, yet its central adversarial threat ("reconstruction", the recovery of an individual's hidden attribute values from a synthetic release and a handful of known quasi-identifiers) has been studied only in scattered, hard-to-compare settings.
By Steven Golob, Sikha Pentyala, Martine De Cock
The paper investigates what a service must retain to faithfully reproduce a training pipeline after data deletion requests, focusing on a rule where earlier similar records block later ones. It shows that a limit on future deletions precisely determines which records can still be needed for training, enabling an exact repair of training statistics after repeated deletions. The authors also construct finite‑precision features for ridge regression and demonstrate that the required private information can be minimized across a sequence of deletion requests, validating their approach on 1,001 AskUbuntu records.
By Priyank Jayraj, Devanshu sahoo, Uday Mittal
The paper introduces a new gradient inversion attack for federated learning that leverages concepts from erasure‑correcting codes to recover entire training batches and their labels from a single FedSGD round. Unlike previous analytic attacks, this method can exactly reconstruct batches of up to 128 samples on ImageNet and achieves over 90% recovery even when the attacker actively manipulates the model. The study demonstrates that federated learning’s privacy leakage is far greater than previously estimated.
By Saeed Shariati, Mohsen Alambardar Meybodi