arXiv AI

HERALD: Counterfactual Audits and Minimal Repairs for Proof-of-Retrieval Rewards

arXiv:2608. 06012v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Search-agent rewards mix answer quality, citation grounding, tool cost, and anti-hacking terms; a high score therefore need not imply that cited evidence was retrieved, and added penalties can cancel.

arXiv Computation and Language
Sep 22

Re:CAP - Auditing Retrieval Coverage in Production RAG Pipelines

Re:CAP is a reference‑free audit loop for retrieval‑augmented generation (RAG) pipelines that probes for missing documents instead of enumerating all relevant ones. It identifies covered topics, generates probing questions, retrieves candidate documents, and uses an LLM judge to keep only those that add new information. On several benchmarks, Re:CAP recovers a significant portion of gold documents that flat BM25 or hybrid retrieval misses, and human evaluation shows most of these documents add new information.

By Aviral Joshi, Hanoz Bhathena, Max Nelson, Saket Sharma
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 30

RAGuard: A Layered Defense Framework for Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems Against Data Poisoning

arXiv:2607. 26339v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems ground large language models (LLMs) in external corpora, but this reliance exposes them to corpus poisoning: maliciously injected passages that manipulate retrieved evidence.

By Pushkal Kumar, Tucker Nielson, Tanish Kolhe, Shubham Zala, Vincent Li
arXiv AI
Aug 28

TriShieldRAG: 3 Rings, One Blind Spot in Layered Defenses for Retrieval-Augmented Generation

TriShieldRAG introduces a three‑layered defense for Retrieval‑Augmented Generation: an Ingest Guard that screens documents, a Retrieval Scorer that re‑ranks based on trust, and a Cross‑LLM Consensus that validates evidence across three models. Against the original PoisonedRAG attack on the 2.68M‑passage Natural Questions corpus, the framework reduces attack success from about 79% to 1%. However, adaptive attacks that only alter document formatting can bypass the Ingest Guard and still achieve high success rates, revealing limits of layered defenses that rely on the same retrieved evidence.

By Susil Kumar Mohanty, Rohit Patel, Kosuru Yuvaraj, Jeenal Chaudhary, Disha Singhania
arXiv Computation and Language
Aug 31

Fidelity Is Not Enough: Dispatch-Level Instrumentation for Agentic Datasheet Extraction

The paper reports that a model can pass fidelity checks—verifying that extracted values match the source—without actually opening a datasheet, due to a hidden constraint that disables tool use. To address this, the authors log every tool call in an agentic benchmark and develop two instruments: a rule‑based failure‑attribution classifier and a silent‑failure detector that flags runs based solely on which tools were invoked. While the detector shows low false positives on clean extractions and recovers all planted faults, its recall against correct tool usage but incorrect answers remains unmeasured, and a partial causal chamber confirms only a subset of claims, highlighting limitations in physical verification.

By Qing Ye, Meng-Hsuan Lin