arXiv:2606.17467v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Prompt injection defenses evaluated on synthetic benchmarks do not generalize to real enterprise documents, which are longer, denser, and int...
arXiv:2606. 22030v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We investigate when belief-based memory actually improves large language model (LLM) agents.
arXiv:2607. 26339v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems ground large language models (LLMs) in external corpora, but this reliance exposes them to corpus poisoning: maliciously injected passages that manipulate retrieved evidence.
The paper presents a retrieval‑admissibility verification framework for long‑term memory agents, classifying each memory‑query pair as admissible, inadmissible, or unresolved. It evaluates the framework on public benchmarks (RHELM and MemOps), showing improved anchor recall and reduced exact similarity errors, while also revealing that existing verifiers miss certain inadmissible exposures. The study highlights the need for separate checks on candidate support, admissibility, prompt exposure, and answer disclosure to ensure safe memory retrieval.
TriShieldRAG introduces a three‑layered defense for Retrieval‑Augmented Generation: an Ingest Guard that screens documents, a Retrieval Scorer that re‑ranks based on trust, and a Cross‑LLM Consensus that validates evidence across three models. Against the original PoisonedRAG attack on the 2.68M‑passage Natural Questions corpus, the framework reduces attack success from about 79% to 1%. However, adaptive attacks that only alter document formatting can bypass the Ingest Guard and still achieve high success rates, revealing limits of layered defenses that rely on the same retrieved evidence.
arXiv:2607. 23838v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) lets a large language model answer questions using documents retrieved from an external knowledge base at query time.
The paper introduces Trustworthy RAG, an evaluation agent designed to detect misinformation and knowledge poisoning in Retrieval-Augmented Generation systems. It combines natural language inference verification, a five-signal poison detector, and a weighted Trust Index to assess the reliability of retrieved content. Experiments on multiple LLMs show high accuracy and precision, with the agent effectively blocking unsafe advice in a secure-coding assistant scenario.
arXiv:2603. 22934v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) improves large language model applications by grounding generation in retrieved evidence, but also introduces corpus poisoning as a new attack surface.
arXiv:2606. 12703v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) agents increasingly run with persistent memory that accumulates across user sessions.
arXiv:2609.00470v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) grounds large language models in external corpora, but implicit trust in retrieved documents creates a critical at...
arXiv:2610.22959v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on persistent memory to support long-term reasoning and personalized interactions. However, infor...
Agent Zero Memory is a provenance‑aware long‑term memory system for large language model agents that distills user interactions into three parallel memory structures: an episodic timeline, an associative entity‑event knowledge graph, and a semantic, citation‑locked hierarchical documentary memory. Retrieval is performed via an intent gate, source router, and concurrent searches across the three systems, producing integrated, cited answers that exclude fabrication and require evidence the reader has opened. The system achieves state‑of‑the‑art performance on LongMemEval (95.60%) and LoCoMo (93.60%) while offering a favorable accuracy‑cost‑latency trade‑off across multiple backbone LLMs.