arXiv:2606. 28358v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) aims to enhance the trustworthiness of Large Language Models (LLMs) by grounding their outputs in external documents, often using inline citations for verifiability.
By Ian van Dort (University of Amsterdam), Maria Heuss (University of Amsterdam)
CiteVQA is a benchmark that evaluates multimodal large language models on both answering document questions and providing element‑level bounding‑box citations for the evidence used. It contains 1,897 questions across 711 PDFs in seven domains and two languages, with ground‑truth citations generated via an automated pipeline and strict quality control. The evaluation metric, Strict Attributed Accuracy (SAA), rewards a prediction only when both the answer and the cited region are correct, revealing widespread attribution hallucination in current models.
By Dongsheng Ma, Jiayu Li, Zhengren Wang, Yijie Wang, Jiahao Kong, Weijun Zeng, Jutao Xiao, Jie Yang, Bangrui Xu, Yuhan Wang, Bin Wang, Conghui He
arXiv:2608. 02678v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to corpus poisoning: an attacker who inserts a crafted document into the retrieval corpus can steer the underlying large language model (LLM) toward an attacker-chosen wrong answer.
By Abay Zhurekbay, Tao Liu, Fan Li
arXiv:2607. 23838v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) lets a large language model answer questions using documents retrieved from an external knowledge base at query time.
By Susil Kumar Mohanty, Rohit Patel, Kosuru Yuvaraj, Jeenal Chaudhary, Disha Singhania
arXiv:2509. 00761v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models are increasingly deployed for legal question answering, where evaluations typically focus on multiple-choice accuracy.
By Boqin Yuan, Ziqi Wang
RAGSentinel is a training‑free, label‑free defense designed for black‑box retrieval‑augmented generation systems. It employs a surrogate encoder to detect hidden‑state shifts caused by retrieved documents, removes shared topic directions, and filters poisoned documents as geometric outliers from a robust majority consensus. The method is proven to recover a poison‑free majority context under honest‑majority and representation‑separation assumptions, and experiments show it keeps attack success rates low while maintaining accuracy across multiple datasets, LLM families, and adaptive attacks.
By Yueyang Quan, Anjun Gao, Yufei Xia, Minghong Fang, Zhuqing Liu