arXiv:2606. 28683v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) often face ethical tradeoffs in which several responses may be defensible but express different priorities, such as fairness, honesty, courage, or restraint.
arXiv:2603. 00048v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive applications including psychological support, healthcare, and high-stakes decision-making.
arXiv:2608. 12368v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agreement with human judgments is a common proxy for evaluating the alignment of large language models (LLMs).
arXiv:2606. 09475v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Work on `emergent misalignment' shows that finetuning LLMs on narrow tasks can induce broadly misaligned behavior.
arXiv:2607. 10871v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Contemplative traditions have long guided ethical behavior and prosocial interaction, and recent work suggests that contemplative principles (e.
arXiv:2607. 20461v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Present implementations of artificial intelligence (AI) ethics do not adequately take feelings, or affect, into account.
The paper investigates how large language models encode moral knowledge by training linear probes for each Moral Foundations Theory category and analyzing their geometric relationships. It finds that the model’s moral directions are largely independent yet share a common component, indicating integration rather than collapse into a single detector. This structure is consistent across architectures, emerges early in pre‑training, and reflects corpus statistics rather than the individualizing/binding distinction of Moral Foundations Theory.
arXiv:2609.03330v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Moral language plays a central role in shaping online endorsement and the diffusion of information, yet existing moral foundation detection systems oft...
The study investigates how large language models encode moral knowledge by training linear probes for each category of Moral Foundations Theory. It finds that the model’s representations for different moral foundations occupy distinct, largely independent dimensions yet share a common positive component, indicating an integrated but nuanced moral structure. This geometry is consistent across model architectures and scales, emerges early in pre‑training, and reflects corpus statistics rather than the individualizing/binding distinction of the theory.
arXiv:2606. 11635v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: For highly capable AI systems to operate safely in dynamic, open-ended environments, they must be able to identify, understand, and respond to moral reasons for action, and constrain their behaviour accordingly.
arXiv:2605. 25240v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Two methodologies dominate current practices of benchmarking: rubric-based scoring evaluates items against predefined criteria, whereas comparative judgment elicits pairwise preferences between outputs.
arXiv:2601. 21433v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Language models are increasingly consulted on ethically consequential questions, yet the stance a model expresses may not survive a change in framing.
The article argues that current evaluations of large language models’ moral competence focus mainly on whether outputs align with human moral values—the so‑called moral value problem—while neglecting the moral norm problem, which concerns the models’ ability to identify and apply context‑sensitive moral norms. It attributes this imbalance to the field’s reliance on descriptive ethics frameworks that emphasize value representation over normative application. The authors review existing benchmarks, highlight three gaps—lack of ground‑truth norm data, insufficient evaluation of intermediate reasoning, and limited focus on context‑relevant features—and propose a research agenda to develop formal normative representations, expert‑annotated datasets, and evaluation protocols that distinguish between value‑level and norm‑level competence.