arXiv:2607. 07766v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have become significant providers of mental health support, yet they remain products of an attention economy whose operational and commercial targets favour sustained engagement over the friction that effective psychological support often requires.
By Gwydion Williams, Sara Zannone, Bilal A Mateen
The paper argues that AI alignment depends on a system’s ability to exhibit a coherent moral policy—stable, monotonic, decisive, and Pareto‑viable—rather than on any specific moral standard. The authors test nine large language models across varied moral scenarios and find that none maintain consistent verdicts, with surface‑form changes causing up to 99% shifts in outcomes. This indicates that current LLM agents lack the structural moral competence required for meaningful alignment.
By Arno Libert, Derck W. E. Prinzhorn, Daan R. Henselmans
Large language models (LLMs) have become significant providers of mental health support, yet they remain products of an attention economy whose operational and commercial targets favour sustained engagement over the friction that effective psychological support often requires. Developers' safety responses have been largely reactive, addressing the most visible and acute harms while subtler, longer-term patterns of risk (e.
arXiv:2606. 19527v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Can Large Language Models (LLMs) discern when their own outputs are misaligned with human ethics?
By Martin Kol\'a\v{r}
arXiv:2609.38260v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Values such as honesty, autonomy, and confidentiality are often regarded as general principles underpinning AI alignment. However, what it means to a...
By Olivia Macmillan-Scott, Mirco Musolesi
Warning: This paper studies stereotypes and biases, and contains potentially disturbing examples, used for illustration purposes only. Our findings should not be interpreted as an argument against alignment.