arXiv:2606. 13441v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have prompted claims that such systems exhibit agency or qualify as moral agents.
arXiv:2510. 12229v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to internalize human-like biases during finetuning, yet the mechanisms by which these biases manifest remain unclear.
The paper introduces a novel framework for assessing second‑order bias in large language models (LLMs), defined as bias in how an LLM judges the acceptability of biased content. Using principles from entitlement epistemology, the authors design a reasoning task that asks LLMs to determine whether a biased text is acceptable for specific demographic groups, and propose two metrics to quantify biased judgments. Experiments on both open‑source and closed‑source models reveal that the task bypasses safety guardrails, uncovers systematic variations across target groups, and demonstrates that models still rely on demographic labels when evaluating bias.
arXiv:2608. 15354v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLMs are increasingly used in morally sensitive contexts, yet it is unclear whether they apply ethical principles consistently across situations.
arXiv:2606. 31213v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as moral advisors and agents, they need to address dilemmas between two competing values.
As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed behavior that designers never specified. We present a formal safety argument for the Scientist AI (SAI) Predictor, trained to approximate the Bayesian posterior conditioned on a dataset of "epistemically contextualized" natural-language statements.
arXiv:2606. 22974v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Recent work on preference elicitation in large language models (LLMs) has demonstrated that, when given a series of choices between two outcomes, LLMs reveal a coherent, model-specific utility structure.
arXiv:2603.16017v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) increasingly participate in morally sensitive decision-making, yet how they organize ethical frameworks across r...
The paper introduces a systematic study of how large language models (LLMs) perform social attribution—specifically responsibility and blame judgments—by creating a benchmark with 7,639 questions drawn from classic attribution theory scenarios and real-world narratives. It evaluates 32 LLMs and 5 non-LLM baselines, finding that larger models show greater but still incomplete alignment with human judgments. A probing methodology further reveals that certain attribution dimensions can be decoded from specific hidden-state positions, and their influence on LLM outputs mirrors patterns predicted by human Attribution Theory.
arXiv:2606. 19527v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Can Large Language Models (LLMs) discern when their own outputs are misaligned with human ethics?
arXiv:2609.07943v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: There is significant uncertainty about whether abstractions like beliefs or desires usefully describe the behavior of large language models (LLMs). In...
arXiv:2610.07186v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models make claims about themselves that are both consequential and increasingly difficult to verify from behavior alone. How can we dis...
arXiv:2606. 29657v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed behavior that designers never specified.