arXiv:2606. 13441v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have prompted claims that such systems exhibit agency or qualify as moral agents.
arXiv:2604. 06543v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In this work, we demonstrate that reliable stochastic sampling is a fundamental yet unfulfilled requirement for Large Language Models (LLMs) operating as agents.
arXiv:2510. 12229v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to internalize human-like biases during finetuning, yet the mechanisms by which these biases manifest remain unclear.
The paper introduces a novel framework for assessing second‑order bias in large language models (LLMs), defined as bias in how an LLM judges the acceptability of biased content. Using principles from entitlement epistemology, the authors design a reasoning task that asks LLMs to determine whether a biased text is acceptable for specific demographic groups, and propose two metrics to quantify biased judgments. Experiments on both open‑source and closed‑source models reveal that the task bypasses safety guardrails, uncovers systematic variations across target groups, and demonstrates that models still rely on demographic labels when evaluating bias.
arXiv:2608. 15354v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLMs are increasingly used in morally sensitive contexts, yet it is unclear whether they apply ethical principles consistently across situations.
arXiv:2606. 31213v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as moral advisors and agents, they need to address dilemmas between two competing values.
As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed behavior that designers never specified. We present a formal safety argument for the Scientist AI (SAI) Predictor, trained to approximate the Bayesian posterior conditioned on a dataset of "epistemically contextualized" natural-language statements.
arXiv:2606. 22974v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Recent work on preference elicitation in large language models (LLMs) has demonstrated that, when given a series of choices between two outcomes, LLMs reveal a coherent, model-specific utility structure.
arXiv:2606. 19527v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Can Large Language Models (LLMs) discern when their own outputs are misaligned with human ethics?
arXiv:2606. 29657v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed behavior that designers never specified.
The study investigates bias in large language model (LLM) judges by having ten LLMs evaluate narrative constraint selections rather than generated text. Results show that self-preference largely disappears under blind evaluation when quality and evaluator severity are controlled, but self- and other-labels alone shift scores bidirectionally when quality is matched. The authors conclude that authorship attribution drives evaluation bias and that open-ended, ground‑truth‑free tasks can effectively study LLM judge behavior.
arXiv:2505.11924v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Intrinsic moral self-correction refers to the phenomenon where a language model refines its ethical judgments or aligns its outputs purely th...
The paper investigates how large language models encode moral knowledge by training linear probes for each Moral Foundations Theory category and analyzing their geometric relationships. It finds that the model’s moral directions are largely independent yet share a common component, indicating integration rather than collapse into a single detector. This structure is consistent across architectures, emerges early in pre‑training, and reflects corpus statistics rather than the individualizing/binding distinction of Moral Foundations Theory.