arXiv:2604. 22167v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Language models are increasingly capable and are being rapidly deployed on a population-level scale.
arXiv:2607. 18295v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study whether alignment schemes that reshape a base model's output distribution, combined with bounded safety filters, can drive the probability of harmful behavior to zero in modern large language models.
arXiv:2608. 10621v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent research on Large Language Model (LLM) safety has widely adopted guardrails to identify unsafe LLM outputs.
arXiv:2607. 20286v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We propose a novel framework for computing rigorous bounds on the probability that a large language model (LLM) generates harmful output to a given prompt.
arXiv:2608. 14577v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Frontier large language models (LLMs) safety evaluation has largely treated harmful generation as an attack outcome rather than as an object of analysis.
We propose a novel framework for computing rigorous bounds on the probability that a large language model (LLM) generates harmful output to a given prompt. We study a new application of the Clopper-Pearson confidence intervals to obtain probably approximately correct (PAC) bounds for this problem.
arXiv:2607. 18454v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Quantifying the risk of rare failures in language models, such as those triggered by adversarial distribution shifts or very large-scale deployments, requires estimating probabilities far too small for random sampling.
arXiv:2512. 05518v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) play a critical role in the democratization of AI, yet their "open" nature introduces more avenues for malicious actors to misuse them for harmful purposes.
arXiv:2606. 04778v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to interventions during inference that redirect generation toward harmful outputs.
arXiv:2606. 04168v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) is fragile in part because it is often shallow: fine-tuning mainly reshapes the model's behavior near the first few output tokens.
Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content. In this work, we reveal that this advanced safety awareness inadvertently introduces a fatal vulnerability.
arXiv:2603. 07445v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) often require fine-tuning (FT) to perform well on downstream tasks, but FT can induce safety-alignment drift even when the training dataset contains only benign data.
Safety training for large language models (LLMs) is conducted predominantly in English, leaving uncertain how well safety mechanisms generalize to low-resource languages and mixed-language code-switching. We show that this creates an epistemic gap in which models confidently generate harmful responses for inputs that fall outside the distribution of their safety training.