arXiv:2607. 00002v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Moral cognition has traditionally been modeled as adherence to fixed ethical theories--deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics--implemented as static rules or value functions.
By Max Kanwal, Caryn Tran, Patrick Mineault
arXiv:2606. 11232v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Existing LLM moral benchmarks usually ask which isolated moral act, value, or foundation a model prefers.
By Weijia Zhang, Ruiqi Chen, Yunze Xiao, Weihao Xuan
arXiv:2604. 24155v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The project of aligning machine behavior with human values raises a basic problem: whose moral expectations should guide AI decision-making?
By Benjamin Minhao Chen, Xinyu Xie
arXiv:2608. 14522v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI systems make more morally loaded decisions across society, one response has been moral preference elicitation.
By Taenyun Kim, Edyta Bogucka, Daniele Quercia
arXiv:2608. 15354v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLMs are increasingly used in morally sensitive contexts, yet it is unclear whether they apply ethical principles consistently across situations.
By Pegah Nokhiz, Aravinda Kanchana Ruwanpathirana, Helen Nissenbaum
arXiv:2608. 12368v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agreement with human judgments is a common proxy for evaluating the alignment of large language models (LLMs).
By Octavian M. Machidon, Alina L. Machidon, Vojko Strahovnik, Mateja Centa Strahovnik, Jonas Miklav\v{c}i\v{c}, Marko Robnik \v{S}ikonja
arXiv:2606. 31213v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as moral advisors and agents, they need to address dilemmas between two competing values.
By Jongchan Choi, Nari Yang, Sung Soo Park, Jaemin Cho, Han Seoyoung, Haerin Shin, Jun-Hyung Park
arXiv:2608. 14566v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent work on evaluating the moral competence of large language models (LLMs) has focused primarily on what we call the moral value problem, i.
By Aidan Kierans, Ritam Dutt, Kaley Rittichier, Shiri Dori-Hacohen, Avijit Ghosh
arXiv:2606. 11635v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: For highly capable AI systems to operate safely in dynamic, open-ended environments, they must be able to identify, understand, and respond to moral reasons for action, and constrain their behaviour accordingly.
By Menghang Zhu, Seth Lazar
arXiv:2606. 00013v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Social conformity is a well-documented phenomenon in which individuals shift their opinions towards those of a social majority.
By Yana Venerina, Dmitry Koch, Nare Meloyan, Gerda Prutko, Valeriia Lelik, Victoria Taova, Andrey Kurpatov
arXiv:2608. 08061v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The key question in moral judgement is not simply whether someone chooses the "right" answer, but how they decide what matters most when moral principles conflict.
By Siddarth Singh, Victoria Williams, Simon Rosen, Ebenezer Gelo, Helen Sarah Robertson, Ibrahim Suder, Benjamin Rosman, Geraud Nangue Tasse, Steven James
arXiv:2606. 13755v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We argue that aligning AI to aggregated human preferences is the wrong target.
By Nikita Kazeev, Bui Nhat Huyen Phan