arXiv:2606. 11232v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Existing LLM moral benchmarks usually ask which isolated moral act, value, or foundation a model prefers.
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The paper investigates how large language models encode moral knowledge by training linear probes for each Moral Foundations Theory category and analyzing their geometric relationships. It finds that the model’s moral directions are largely independent yet share a common component, indicating integration rather than collapse into a single detector. This structure is consistent across architectures, emerges early in pre‑training, and reflects corpus statistics rather than the individualizing/binding distinction of Moral Foundations Theory.
The paper argues that AI alignment depends on a system’s ability to exhibit a coherent moral policy—stable, monotonic, decisive, and Pareto‑viable—rather than on any specific moral standard. The authors test nine large language models across varied moral scenarios and find that none maintain consistent verdicts, with surface‑form changes causing up to 99% shifts in outcomes. This indicates that current LLM agents lack the structural moral competence required for meaningful alignment.
The study investigates how large language models encode moral knowledge by training linear probes for each category of Moral Foundations Theory. It finds that the model’s representations for different moral foundations occupy distinct, largely independent dimensions yet share a common positive component, indicating an integrated but nuanced moral structure. This geometry is consistent across model architectures and scales, emerges early in pre‑training, and reflects corpus statistics rather than the individualizing/binding distinction of the theory.
arXiv:2606. 06972v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Ensuring that agent behaviours are aligned with human moral values inevitably raises the problem of how to account for the plurality of moral perspectives that societies -- and even individuals -- typically adopt.
arXiv:2608. 12368v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agreement with human judgments is a common proxy for evaluating the alignment of large language models (LLMs).
arXiv:2608.28610v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing LLM moral evaluations typically present models with isolated moral vignettes and elicit a single-shot decision, neglecting a factor known to p...