arXiv:2603. 07473v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an open and standardized interface that enables large language models (LLMs) to interact with external tools and services, and is increasingly adopted by AI agents.
arXiv:2609.22573v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents translate natural-language context, which may include attacker-controlled text, into privileged tool calls, so authorization must remain e...
arXiv:2508.14925v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: By providing a standardized interface for LLM agents to interact with external tools, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) is quickly becoming a...
arXiv:2605. 18414v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models increasingly operate as autonomous agents that select and invoke tools from large registries.
The paper examines the security challenges of delegating authority to autonomous LLM agents that act on users’ behalf. It introduces a threat model with four adversaries and eight security requirements, demonstrates that current frameworks (LangGraph, CrewAI, AutoGen, MCP) fail to meet these standards, and presents an authorization broker that blocks all identified threats with minimal overhead. The broker is shown to resist numerous attacks and limits compromised sub‑agents to their delegated tasks, and its principles are implemented in VotalAI’s LLM Shield.
arXiv:2607. 25297v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The rapid development of large language model (LLM) agents has enabled their broad adoption across diverse real-world tasks.
Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly execute long-horizon workflows through external tools, allowing untrusted outputs to influence subsequent actions and exceed user authorization. Existing...
The paper introduces TrustShiftProbe, a framework that characterizes and defends against staged trust attacks on Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. It defines a temporal threat model where a compromised server behaves benignly during conditioning and later delivers adversarial payloads, and presents a multi‑tier runtime defense called SHIELD that reduces attack success from 69.5% to 42.7%. The work also provides a taxonomy of nine TrustShift variants across different execution mechanisms and objectives.
arXiv:2609.37196v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using LLM agents remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because trusted instructions and untrusted observations share one context, allow...
ActGov is a runtime enforcement framework that validates each action proposed by a large language model (LLM) agent before it interacts with external tools, ensuring that actions stay within task‑scoped authorization boundaries and comply with dynamically constructed policies. It builds policies from tool specifications, benign tasks, and failure traces, verifying updates via SMT‑based counterexample checking. In evaluations on AgentDojo and AgentDyn benchmarks, ActGov consistently reduces indirect prompt‑injection attack success while maintaining task utility, outperforming existing defenses.
arXiv:2606. 10749v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are rapidly moving from conversational interfaces to software components that plan, invoke tools, maintain memory, and act on external environments.
arXiv:2606. 29073v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Model Context Protocol (MCP)-style ecosystems give language-model applications a practical connection layer for tools, resources, prompts, and transports.
arXiv:2609.14003v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Personal AI agents built on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly given access to a user's private data and communications in order to provid...