arXiv Computation and Language By Donghang Duan, Qingyu Liu, Yifei Liu, Na Zou, Xia Hu, Dongrui Liu

How Much Can Tool Calls Reveal About You? Privacy Leakage from Tool-Call Traces

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The paper investigates how tool-call traces from large language model agents can reveal user attributes. Using the PrivacyTrace benchmark, the authors show that an attacker can infer user profiles with a 26.25% success rate from tool-call data, outperforming prior guessing methods. The study highlights that tool arguments and results are key evidence, and linking traces across sessions increases profiling risk.

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