The paper introduces the Theory of Strategic Evolution, outlining three core principles—situated choice, reproductive transmission, and institution‑mediated coupling—that govern strategic replicators. It formalizes how agents’ choices influence continuation or reproduction, how successors inherit organizational structures, and how institutions shape these dynamics. The work includes formal models, proofs, and examples, such as a market‑rent‑entry model and a deployment scenario, to illustrate the theory’s application to strategic replication.
arXiv:2512. 07901v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Von Neumann founded both game theory and the theory of self-reproducing automata, but the two programs never merged.
arXiv:2512. 07901v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Von Neumann founded both game theory and the theory of self-reproducing automata, but the two programs never merged.
arXiv:2512. 04988v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Emerging agentic marketplaces provide the economic infrastructure for matching and coordinating the large amounts of AI agents used in agentic swarms.
arXiv:2606. 28710v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We ask under what conditions an agent with a harm-minimizing policy can displace an approval-seeking (RLHF) agent in a competitive market, and when that policy is sufficient to prevent community harm.
arXiv:2608. 06020v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Economic World Models (EWMs) are generative economic models that simulate how economies evolve from within by modeling heterogeneous agents, their beliefs and actions, and the market and institutional mechanisms through which their interactions produce aggregate outcomes.
arXiv:2604. 14990v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The prospect of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is increasingly driving institutional decisions, and alignment of AGI is a hard problem.
arXiv:2601. 19082v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents that negotiate, coordinate, and act on behalf of users.
arXiv:2608. 07545v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: An LLM agent's capability depends not only on model weights but on its harness: prompts, tools, skills, and control flow.
Economic World Models (EWMs) are generative economic models that simulate how economies evolve from within by modeling heterogeneous agents, their beliefs and actions, and the market and institutional mechanisms through which their interactions produce aggregate outcomes. This paper develops an implementation roadmap for building economic world models as generative engines in which heterogeneous agents act, interact, adapt, and co-evolve with markets and institutions, thereby producing economic dynamics from the inside.
The paper proposes a new framework for collective information engines that rely on role differentiation rather than consensus. By modeling anti‑coordination games, agents infer roles from noisy social signals tied to persistent identities, and role‑following actions reinforce those identities, creating a feedback loop that can drive collective order. The authors show that when a social loop gain—determined by identity persistence, cognitive capacity, channel fidelity, and schema strength—exceeds one, roles emerge in a bifurcation cascade whose type is selected by resource‑driven replicator dynamics, offering a mechanistic basis for distributional AGI takeoff and a control lever for platform design.
The paper proposes five runtime primitives—discovery, identity, governance, attestation, and supply chain—to manage autonomous AI agents in enterprise settings. It argues that traditional control models fail because agents are transient, model-driven, and self‑discoverable, making runtime governance essential. The authors detail an implementation that mediates agent actions against policy, authorizes them via a per‑tenant vocabulary, and records them in a verifiable ledger, noting the associated operational costs and partial deployment status.
arXiv:2608. 03076v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent studies commonly place AI agents in predefined games, markets, or roles, making it difficult to distinguish endogenous economic organization from behavior inherited from the scenario.