arXiv:2512. 02318v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: This paper studies how multimodal large language models (MLLMs) undermine the security guarantees of visual CAPTCHA.
arXiv:2603. 23559v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: GUI agents are rapidly shifting from multi-module pipelines to end-to-end, native vision-language models (VLMs) that perceive raw screenshots and directly interact with digital devices.
The paper introduces Motion Vision CAPTCHA (MVCAP), a new CAPTCHA framework that relies on motion-defined foreground structures to create challenges that are only solvable through temporal analysis of a dynamic background. MVCAP is implemented in three progressive levels—coherent motion, structural motion, and biological motion—and evaluated using the MVCAP-Bench, a browser-based benchmark with 600 live CAPTCHA instances. Human participants achieve 99.6% accuracy, whereas the best GUI agent scores only 16.8%, highlighting a significant human–agent perception gap and demonstrating that dynamic background camouflage is the key difficulty.
arXiv:2510.09302v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable success in difficult purely textual mathematical reasoning tasks, eve...
arXiv:2511.18921v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Backdoor attacks undermine the reliability and trustworthiness of machine learning systems by injecting hidden behaviors that can be maliciously ac...
Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) achieve strong performance on vision-language tasks, but incorporating visual inputs through a vision encoder (e. g.
Large vision-language models (LVLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that exploit visual inputs to bypass safety alignment inherited from their language backbones. We propose SafeCap, a reinforcement-learning framework that aligns LVLMs through learned self-captioning.
The paper investigates how Vision Language Models (VLMs) can be fooled by tiny, human‑imperceptible changes to images. It introduces a gradient‑based attack that targets only the vision encoder, reducing computational cost while still effectively disrupting both untargeted and targeted multimodal interpretations. Experiments on open‑source VLMs such as Qwen2.5‑VL, Granite‑Vision, FastVLM, and Phi‑3.5‑Vision demonstrate that these small perturbations can dramatically alter the models’ textual outputs.
The paper investigates how Vision Language Models (VLMs) can be fooled by small, human‑imperceptible changes to images. It introduces a gradient‑based attack that targets only the vision encoder, reducing computational cost while still effectively disrupting both untargeted and targeted multimodal alignment. Experiments on open‑source VLMs such as Qwen2.5‑VL, Granite‑Vision, FastVLM, and Phi‑3.5‑Vision demonstrate that these perturbations can significantly alter the models’ textual outputs.
arXiv:2608.30705v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) struggle with fine-grained Visual Search, the task of locating small or rare objects in high-resolution images...
arXiv:2406. 09250v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly susceptible to sophisticated adversarial attacks, including adaptive strategies specifically designed to bypass existing defenses.
With the increasing diversity of spoofing attacks, there is a growing demand for unified Face Anti-Spoofing (FAS) models capable of detecting both physical and digital threats. While existing Vision-Language Models (VLMs) demonstrate high generalization in this context, they heavily rely on complex multimodal fusion and external text encoders.