arXiv:2603. 23559v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: GUI agents are rapidly shifting from multi-module pipelines to end-to-end, native vision-language models (VLMs) that perceive raw screenshots and directly interact with digital devices.
By Yuxi Chen, Haoyu Zhai, Chenkai Wang, Rui Yang, Lingming Zhang, Gang Wang, Huan Zhang
arXiv:2608.29802v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Face recognition systems are increasingly deployed in security-critical applications, yet they remain vulnerable to presentation and morph attacks. Pre...
By Hatef Otroshi Shahreza, Asif Hussain Khan, Peter Lorenz, Alain Komaty, S\'ebastien Marcel
arXiv:2608.28794v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Our work evaluates the effectiveness of automated methods for solving CAPTCHA challenges commonly encountered in darknet environments. These CAPTCHAs...
By Benjamin Fehrensen, Jens Hubler
arXiv:2606. 02449v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multimodal agents are increasingly expected to operate interfaces on behalf of users, raising a central deployment question: can they truly substitute for humans in workflows that services deliberately protect against automation?
By Xinhao Song, Su Su, Sirui Song, Hongliang Wu, Wen Shen, Zhihua Wei, Gongshen Liu, Linfeng Zhang, Dongrui Liu
The paper introduces Motion Vision CAPTCHA (MVCAP), a new CAPTCHA framework that relies on motion-defined foreground structures to create challenges that are only solvable through temporal analysis of a dynamic background. MVCAP is implemented in three progressive levels—coherent motion, structural motion, and biological motion—and evaluated using the MVCAP-Bench, a browser-based benchmark with 600 live CAPTCHA instances. Human participants achieve 99.6% accuracy, whereas the best GUI agent scores only 16.8%, highlighting a significant human–agent perception gap and demonstrating that dynamic background camouflage is the key difficulty.
By Zeyu Zhang, Dingyi Rong, Zijian Chen, Zicheng Zhang, Xiongkuo Min, Guangtao Zhai
arXiv:2511.18921v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Backdoor attacks undermine the reliability and trustworthiness of machine learning systems by injecting hidden behaviors that can be maliciously ac...
By Juncheng Li, Yige Li, Hanxun Huang, Yunhao Chen, Xin Wang, Yixu Wang, Xingjun Ma, Yu-Gang Jiang
arXiv:2607. 01303v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Presentation Attack Detection (PAD) serves as a crucial safeguard for face recognition systems against presentation attacks such as printed photos, replayed videos, and 3D masks.
By Haoyuan Zhang, Xiangyu Zhu, Li Gao, Ajian Liu, Siran Peng, Zhen Lei
The paper introduces DF‑CAPTCHA, an active defense that asks callers to complete simple challenge‑response tasks during voice and video calls. By evaluating responses on realism, identity consistency, task completion, and response time, the system can detect real‑time deepfake impersonations. Experiments across audio and video modalities show that DF‑CAPTCHA outperforms passive artifact‑search methods, achieving high accuracy and demonstrating the effectiveness of challenge‑based verification against next‑generation social engineering attacks.
By Guy Frankovits, Lior Yasur, Fred M. Grabovski, Yisroel Mirsky
The paper introduces OverThink, a slowdown attack that forces reasoning language models (RLMs) to produce many more reasoning tokens while still giving correct answers. By injecting decoy reasoning problems—such as Markov decision processes, language translation, or graphic comprehension—into the model’s context, attackers can dramatically increase token generation (up to 46× on SQuAD and 17× on coding agents). The study evaluates the attack on both proprietary and open-source RLMs across multiple datasets, explores multimodal and coding‑agent variants, and tests several defenses, concluding that defending against OverThink is challenging and that newer RLMs are even more vulnerable due to higher per‑token costs and increased reasoning token usage.
By Abhinav Kumar, Jaechul Roh, Ali Naseh, Marzena Karpinska, Mohit Iyyer, Amir Houmansadr, Eugene Bagdasarian
Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) achieve strong performance on vision-language tasks, but incorporating visual inputs through a vision encoder (e. g.
The paper investigates how Vision Language Models (VLMs) can be fooled by tiny, human‑imperceptible changes to images. It introduces a gradient‑based attack that targets only the vision encoder, reducing computational cost while still effectively disrupting both untargeted and targeted multimodal interpretations. Experiments on open‑source VLMs such as Qwen2.5‑VL, Granite‑Vision, FastVLM, and Phi‑3.5‑Vision demonstrate that these small perturbations can dramatically alter the models’ textual outputs.
arXiv:2608. 05715v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as planners in robotic systems, where they translate natural-language commands into executable actions grounded in visual scene understanding.
By S. M . Bhagya P. Samarakoon, M. A. Viraj J. Muthugala, W. K. R. Sachinthana, Mohan Rajesh Elara