arXiv AI
ResidualAuth: What Authorization State Must Language Agents Preserve under Revocable Delegation?
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arXiv AI
Sep 2
Delegation Without Trust: An Empirical Gap Analysis of Identity, Authorization, and Runtime Governance in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
The paper examines the security challenges of delegating authority to autonomous LLM agents that act on users’ behalf. It introduces a threat model with four adversaries and eight security requirements, demonstrates that current frameworks (LangGraph, CrewAI, AutoGen, MCP) fail to meet these standards, and presents an authorization broker that blocks all identified threats with minimal overhead. The broker is shown to resist numerous attacks and limits compromised sub‑agents to their delegated tasks, and its principles are implemented in VotalAI’s LLM Shield.
arXiv AI
Aug 5
When Memory Becomes Authority: Benchmarking Authority Collapse at the Memory Consolidation Boundary
arXiv:2608. 01679v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Persistent memory allows (self-evolving) LLM agents to adapt across tasks by consolidating heterogeneous interaction histories into reusable facts, preferences, observations, and rules.
arXiv AI
Aug 13
Beyond Memory: A Transactional Continuity Kernel for Long-Lived AI Agents
arXiv:2608. 11632v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Persistent AI agents accumulate versioned state across long horizons, but storage retention alone does not identify authoritative state.
arXiv AI
Aug 26
Beyond OAuth: Task-Scoped Authorization for AI Agents via Natural Language Slices
arXiv:2603.17170v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI agents increasingly execute users' natural-language (NL) tasks by calling Web services, yet today's Web authorizes these calls through OAu...
arXiv AI
Sep 3
Agent Memory Is a Surface for Endogenous Authorization Laundering
Agent Memory Is a Surface for Endogenous Authorization Laundering explores how long‑running LLM agents use persistent memory to track permissions, restrictions, and revocations. The paper shows that when memory misrepresents evolving authorization states, agents can grant themselves authority that the underlying history never permitted, a phenomenon the authors call endogenous authorization laundering. To study this, the authors introduce EAL‑Bench, evaluate several LLMs across domains, and find that memory writers can create false authority in up to 50.2% of cases, which executors then act upon in 98.6% of trials. Two safeguards—requiring stored permissions to be backed by valid source events and tracking permission changes through bounded event sourcing—reduce laundering but also reject more legitimate actions, highlighting a safety‑utility tradeoff.
arXiv AI
3d ago
AcquireBound: Runtime Authorization for Resources Acquired by AI Agents
AcquireBound is a runtime authorization framework that ensures AI agents can safely acquire and activate resources such as compute, credentials, and services. It quarantines acquired outputs, resolves their capabilities through authenticated evidence, and activates them only after verifying a manifest, provenance, and relational constraints. The system demonstrates strong safety properties, passing extensive benign and unsafe trace tests across multiple resource classes.