arXiv:2611.06159v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study adversarial market making with orders that remain active until execution. The maker operates on two markets: a primary market where orders a...
arXiv:2610.09691v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study online learning in market making, where, at each round, a market maker posts bid and ask prices before observing the market price and the pr...
arXiv:2606. 03736v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study resource-constrained dynamic pricing when the seller seeks revenue and valid inference about demand at a price fixed before the selling season.
arXiv:2609.13547v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study switching regret in adversarial multi-armed bandits, where the learner competes with an arm sequence that changes at most $S$ times. When $S$...
arXiv:2610. 12153v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study episodic constrained Markov decision processes with adversarial losses under stochastic hard constraints.
arXiv:2607. 02196v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study online resource allocation when both rewards and consumption sizes may be continuously distributed.
The paper studies contextual bilateral trade with full feedback, showing that action-independent observations eliminate the usual polynomial adaptation penalty seen in heavy-tailed bandits. It presents fully parameter-free algorithms that achieve oracle minimax regret rates without knowing the moment order or scale, and derives new regret bounds for both parametric and nonparametric settings. The key technical insight is a paired squared‑loss statistic whose noise cancels, enabling model selection and yielding regret rates that interpolate between classical nonparametric and linear extremes.
arXiv:2505.02796v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study budget pacing in repeated first-price auctions when an advertiser's private-value distributions change over time and the stationary...
arXiv:2610.20587v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: An agentic market is a decentralized serving-time market where AI agents bid to claim each user prompt. An agent's bid is based on its expected value...
arXiv:2603. 25029v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study online convex optimization (OCO) with two-point bandit feedback against a non-anticipating adaptive adversary.
arXiv:2606. 09668v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Contextual queueing bandits provide a framework for learning to schedule heterogeneous jobs under unknown context-dependent service rates.
We study how a seller can learn a reserve price for a second-price auction from censored historical bid data. Because values below past reserves are unobserved, even unlimited data may not reveal whic...