arXiv:2608. 13050v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: When a security researcher publishes a report on a cyberattack, detection engineers are supposed to turn it into working detection rules.
arXiv:2608.28394v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is foundational to modern cyber defense, yet much of it resides in unstructured reports whose volume and heterogeneit...
The paper introduces AHLERT, a system that automatically extracts environment-aware hunt leads from Cyber Threat Intelligence reports. It combines a hybrid retriever—dense vector search plus multi-hop knowledge‑graph traversal seeded with MITRE ATT&CK—with ontology‑grounded retrieval‑augmented generation to constrain leads to a defender’s assets. Evaluations on public CTI reports show that AHLERT doubles mean F1 scores and achieves an effectiveness score of ~86.95% compared to off‑the‑shelf LLM models.
arXiv:2510. 11974v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is foundational to modern cybersecurity, enabling organizations to proactively defend against evolving threats.
arXiv:2607. 24563v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Security Operations Centers increasingly rely on automated mapping of Cyber Threat Intelligence reports to MITRE ATT&CK, yet extractor outputs remain fallible and are often stored without the evidence, provenance, and validation history needed to decide whether an individual mapping should be trusted.
The paper audits the reproducibility of knowledge‑graph extraction from threat reports by re‑implementing matching rules for only five of twelve systems and re‑scoring ten system outputs under eight protocols. The audit shows that different matching protocols can reverse most pairwise system rankings and that a fixed prediction set can vary from 0.16 to 0.70 F1. The authors also build CTIForge to isolate validation effects, finding that validation changes precision across backbones and increases entity‑type disputes, and they release the full pipeline, protocol suite, and audit records.
arXiv:2610. 07310v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Security operations centres and national incident-response teams defending critical infrastructure collect abundant threat data yet struggle to turn it into actionable intelligence.
arXiv:2610.18616v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Searching text-rich knowledge graphs requires following relations while examining textual evidence. Predefined graph interfaces constrain what eviden...
arXiv:2606. 03453v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vulnerability disclosure volumes now far exceed organizational assessment capacity, yet three adjacent research communities (proof-of-concept generation, vulnerability prioritization, and detection rule engineering) operate largely in isolation.
arXiv:2607. 03447v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Knowledge graphs (KGs) that underpin Graph-based Retrieval-Augmented Generation (Graph-RAG) are increasingly built automatically by LLM-driven extraction rather than curated by experts.
arXiv:2609. 07344v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) based agents are increasingly applied to cybersecurity tasks such as vulnerability discovery and automated penetration testing.
The paper introduces the Hop-Decayed Influence (HDI) attack, which targets auxiliary schema-level structures—semantic summaries, hierarchical edges, and pre-computed scores—used in GraphRAG pipelines for retrieval prioritisation. By propagating query-aware influence, HDI identifies high-impact targets and corrupts a minuscule fraction (as low as 0.016%) of these structures, achieving an 88–94% success rate across HotpotQA and 2WikiMultiHopQA benchmarks on Microsoft GraphRAG and HippoRAG2 architectures. The modifications affect up to six queries each, yielding a 1:N amplification that instance-level attacks cannot achieve, and they evade perplexity and paraphrase defenses with over 99% evasion, exposing a structural blind spot in current GraphRAG defenses.
arXiv:2608. 16508v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We propose a two-stage large language model (LLM) framework for zero-shot detection of insider threats and advanced persistent threats (APTs) from heterogeneous security logs.