arXiv:2606. 23768v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We propose cryptographic certificates of validity for agentic AI systems.
arXiv:2607. 21325v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Autonomous AI agents increasingly execute actions, invoke tools, and operate on protected resources with limited human oversight.
arXiv:2607. 21325v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous AI agents increasingly execute actions, invoke tools, and operate on protected resources with limited human oversight.
arXiv:2607. 21325v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Autonomous AI agents increasingly execute actions, invoke tools, and operate on protected resources with limited human oversight.
arXiv:2606. 26298v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous AI agents may begin to perform consequential, irreversible actions such as clinical prescribing and production software deployment.
arXiv:2603. 05786v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As AI agents become widely deployed as online services, users often rely on an agent developer's claim about how safety is enforced, which introduces a threat where safety measures are falsely advertised.
arXiv:2607. 05397v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent systems increasingly execute rather than advise.
arXiv:2606. 11632v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic infrastructure introduces a critical control-plane authorization problem: non-deterministic reasoning systems can propose high-stakes mutations to production resources, yet existing security mechanisms -- such as identity and access management (IAM), policy engines, consensus protocols, and audit logs -- either enforce static, context-unaware permissions or merely record actions post-execution.
arXiv:2606. 18098v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have led AI for Theorem Proving to become a promising means of formally verifying computer systems.
arXiv:2608. 14074v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly act on external systems through standardized tool-calling protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP), yet no infrastructure layer constrains their actions to what a principal has verifiably authorized: authorization logic lives in application code, is neither signed nor independently auditable, and the resulting logs lack evidentiary value.
arXiv:2606. 04193v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current AI agent observability is structurally compromised: the entity producing the activity log is the same entity whose activity is being logged.
arXiv:2608. 13958v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: How do we govern AI systems whose reasoning we cannot fully inspect?
The paper introduces a blockchain-backed agentic security framework that protects the entire software development lifecycle and the AI components monitoring it. It coordinates specialized security agents—covering source integrity, dependency and SBOM analysis, CI configuration auditing, artifact verification, and runtime policy evaluation—each powered by a large language model that interprets artifacts, reasons over tool outputs, and generates structured security reports. Every agent produces a cryptographically signed attestation recorded on a permissioned blockchain via smart contracts, creating an immutable attestation log, an agent registry, and an enforceable release‑policy module, while communication is secured through a consortium‑operated certificate authority.