arXiv:2608. 14074v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly act on external systems through standardized tool-calling protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP), yet no infrastructure layer constrains their actions to what a principal has verifiably authorized: authorization logic lives in application code, is neither signed nor independently auditable, and the resulting logs lack evidentiary value.
By Giovanni Racioppi
The paper examines the security challenges of delegating authority to autonomous LLM agents that act on users’ behalf. It introduces a threat model with four adversaries and eight security requirements, demonstrates that current frameworks (LangGraph, CrewAI, AutoGen, MCP) fail to meet these standards, and presents an authorization broker that blocks all identified threats with minimal overhead. The broker is shown to resist numerous attacks and limits compromised sub‑agents to their delegated tasks, and its principles are implemented in VotalAI’s LLM Shield.
By Panduranga Sai Varma Dantuluri, Jyotirmoy Sundi
arXiv:2607. 21325v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Autonomous AI agents increasingly execute actions, invoke tools, and operate on protected resources with limited human oversight.
By M. Llamb\'i-Morillas, D. Fern\'andez-Fern\'andez
arXiv:2607. 21325v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous AI agents increasingly execute actions, invoke tools, and operate on protected resources with limited human oversight.
By M. Llamb\'i-Morillas, D. Fern\'andez-Fern\'andez
arXiv:2607. 21325v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Autonomous AI agents increasingly execute actions, invoke tools, and operate on protected resources with limited human oversight.
By M. Llamb\'i-Morillas, D. Fern\'andez-Fern\'andez
arXiv:2608.30091v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Modern agent frameworks compose planners, tool agents, remote services, and shared specialists into runtime delegation graphs, but their revocation API...
By Lifei Liu, Haoran Yu, Xiaochong Jiang