SafeTune is a source‑available library that consolidates four safety‑intervention paradigms—post‑hoc weight recovery, safety‑constrained fine‑tuning, gradient‑based unlearning, and inference‑time steering—into a single, configuration‑driven workflow. It offers shared interpretability, evaluation, and deployment tools, and its modular registry allows easy addition of new methods, benchmarks, judges, models, and fine‑tuning domains. The authors demonstrate SafeTune with controlled comparisons and case studies in finance and medical deployments, showing how it characterizes safety drift, evaluates interventions on refusal‑behavior and capability metrics, and supports calibrated or layered mitigation.
By Pratinav Seth, Saisab Sadhu, Anshul Kaushal, Vinay Kumar Sankarapu
arXiv:2608. 12025v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Medical devices are becoming more software-intensive, connected, and AI-enabled.
By Tuhinangshu Gangopadhyay, Rasmus Adler, Peter Liggesmeyer, Jan Reich
arXiv:2606. 02755v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) applications are increasingly expected to satisfy deterministic institutional requirements while relying on probabilistic generative components.
By Eric Liang
arXiv:2607. 19449v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Evaluation frameworks for tool-augmented LLM agents focus overwhelmingly on capability metrics or explicit tool crashes, leaving silent infrastructure failures and HTTP 200 responses with empty, null, or malformed payloads largely unaudited.
By Aarushi Singh
arXiv:2607. 22926v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: High-impact generative AI makes catastrophic misuse a lifecycle-control problem, not merely a prompt-filtering problem.
By Mahdi Eslamimehr
arXiv:2606. 26185v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-as-judge ("grader") components are now standard in evaluation harnesses, including safety evaluations where a pass/fail verdict may gate downstream deployment decisions.
By Hiroki Tamba
arXiv:2607. 07097v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety evaluations of multi-agent LLM systems often compare a direct prompt with a planner-executor pipeline and report the difference as a single "pipeline effect.
By Lifei Liu, Haoran Yu, Xiaochong Jiang, Su Wang, Pin Qian, Yihang Chen
arXiv:2607. 25364v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales.
By Genliang Zhu (Accentrust, Georgia Institute of Technology), Chu Wang (Accentrust, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)
The paper introduces Runtime Assurance Contracts (RAC) as a formal policy framework for high‑risk AI agents, addressing the "assurance‑transition gap" by binding autonomy boundaries, component eligibility, evidence state, transition policy, human‑review capacity, and non‑compensatory gates. RAC allows soft metrics to influence routing while mandating retries, switches, escalations, deferrals, or stops when mandatory gates fail or are unknown, ensuring aggregate performance cannot alone authorize action. The authors define the contract, evidence record, permission rule, and five invariants, and evaluate RAC through deterministic failure‑injection studies, hand‑authored traces, and a prospective synthetic holdout, comparing it to score‑only and restricted protocol baselines.
By Serhii Zabolotnii
arXiv:2607. 12469v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many agent-safety evaluation results are not yet load-bearing evidence: identical nominal outcomes (task success, attack success, monitor scores) may sit atop materially different evidence regimes.
By Oleg Solozobov
SAFARI is the first industrial benchmark for evaluating large language models (LLMs) in automotive hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA) under ISO 26262. It comprises 3,000 de‑identified HARA cases and tests two tasks: open‑ended hazard generation and standards‑grounded risk classification, using a novel reference‑anchored LLM‑as‑a‑judge protocol. Experiments with nine state‑of‑the‑art LLMs show that while hazard narratives are often plausible, risk classification remains weak (best ASIL macro‑F1 = 0.261), with errors mainly due to missing scenario context and misjudged controllability.
"whyItMatters":"The benchmark highlights the current limitations of LLMs in safety‑critical engineering workflows, guiding future research and expert oversight in automotive safety analysis."
By Chenxi Wu, Zimu Wang, Haiyang Zhang, Wei Wang, Zhijie Xu
arXiv:2607. 23386v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We document a failure class in frontier large language models -- exception chain collapse -- observed in eligibility evaluation under nested conditional rules of the form "A is required UNLESS B applies, UNLESS C overrides B".
By Paul Simpson, John Kozak, Lisa Doake